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I. INTRODUCTION

The subject of stolen art has recently received substantial
attention from the media 1 and has been the subject of a number of
closely-followed cases, 2 many involving Nazi-looted art. Such cases

* Assistant Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky

University; J.D. Georgetown University Law Center; B.A. University of Florida. The
Author was a litigation associate at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP where she
worked on art disputes and inter-governmental Holocaust negotiations and litigation
before entering academia. The Author wishes to thank ChaseJNKU, Carol Bredemeyer,
Katherine Hurst, Emily Janoski, Jay Haehlen, and Deirdre Aretini for their assistance
and support, as well as Randy Schoenberg, Don Burris, Larry Kaye, Howard Spiegler,
Jeremy Epstein, Konrad Cailteux, and William Barron for taking the time to share
insight into their pending cases.
1.
E.g., Lawrence M. Kaye & Howard N. Spiegler, Looted Art CarriesIts Own
Set of Problems, 4 N.Y.L.J. 1 (2004) ("There has been much publicity in recent years
about the theft of cultural property, ranging from the smuggling of antiquities from
foreign countries (including the artifacts recently looted from the Baghdad Museum) to
the plunder of art by the Nazis during the Holocaust.").
Stephen W. Clark, Selected World War H Restitution Cases, SK061 A.L.I.2.
A.B.A. 217 (2005). See, e.g., U.S. v. Femme en Blanc, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal.
2005); Bennigson v. Alsdorf, No. B168200, 2004 WL 803616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004);
Alsdorf v. Bennigson, No. 04C5953, 2004 WL 2806301 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Warin v.
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were filed in U.S. courts as recently as 2004 and 2005,3 and in 2004,
the U.S. Supreme Court heard one such case, Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, on a narrow issue. 4 Some heirs of deceased Holocaust
survivors are learning, as they look through family documents, for
5
example, that they have claims to art.
Because approximately 20% of all European art was looted by
the Nazis, 6 there is a tremendous amount of artwork with a tainted
past that has traded hands many times. 7 Current possessors of such
art may be completely unaware that it ever was stolen.8 Even if they
are generally aware of the Nazi-looted art problem, many are leery of
initiating a provenance search: possessors may be apprehensive, not
only because the search itself is expensive, but also because they may

Wildenstein & Co., Inc., 297 A.D.2d 214 (N.Y. App. 2002); Rosenberg v. Seattle Art
Museum, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (W.D. Wash. 1999); Wertheimer v. Cirker's Hayes
Storage Warehouse, Inc., No. 105575/00, 2001 WL 1657237 (2001); In Re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Museum of Modern Art, 93 N.Y.2d 729 (N.Y. 1999)
(involving seizure of Portraitof Wally by Egon Schiele); U.S. v. Portrait of Wally, 105 F.
Supp. 2d 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
3.
Femme en Blanc, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1175; Martha Lufkin, Elizabeth Taylor
Contests New Suit to Claim Her Van Gogh, THE ARTNEWSPAPER.COM, Dec. 27, 2004,
available at http://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/article.asp?idart=11671. The case
has since been dismissed. Associated Press, Suit Against Elizabeth Taylor Dismissed,
USA TODAY, February 8, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.con/life/people/200502-08-taylor-suit_x.htm?POE=LIFISVA.
4.
541 U.S. 677 (2004). The parties in Altmann agreed to binding arbitration
in Austria, with a ruling expected by November 1, 2005. Howard Reich, Austrian
Panel, Not U.S. Courts, Will Decide Who Owns Looted Art, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 18,
2005, available at http://www.adele.at. It should be noted that an Austrian art
restitution board in November 2003 recommended the return to the plaintiff, Mrs.
Altmann, of another Klimt, Portrait of a Woman, from the Austrian Gallery. Der
Standard, Ein Weiterer Klimt Wird Restituiert [Klimt Painting Restituted To Heirs of
Bernhard Altmann], Nov. 21, 2003, available at http://www.bslaw.net/news/031121.
html in German and English.
5.
E.g., Rebecca Keim, Filling the Gap Between Morality and Jurisprudence:
The Use of Binding Arbitration to Resolve Claims of Restitution Regarding Nazi-Stolen
Art, 3 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 295, 304 n.80 (2003); Robert Schwartz, The Limits of the
Law: A Call for a New Attitude Toward Artwork Stolen During World War II, 32
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 23 (1998).
6.
Stevenson Swanson, Fifty-three Years after WWII, Ghosts Spawned by Nazi
Looting Return to Haunt Art World, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 8, 1998, at A18 ("By some
estimates, wartime looting affected as much as 20 percent of Europe's treasury of art.").
7.
E.g., Marilyn E. Phelan, Scope of Due Diligence Investigation in Obtaining
Title to Valuable Artwork, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 631, 660 (2000):
According to Ronald Lauder, former U.S. ambassador to Austria and now
chairman of the Museum of Modern Art in New York, "more than 100,000
pieces of art, worth at least $10 billion in total, are still missing from the Nazi
era." Mr. Lauder believes that "because of these large numbers, every
institution, art museum and private collection has some of these missing
works." (internal citations omitted).
Id.
8.

This was claimed by Elizabeth Taylor, for example. See Lufkin, supra note
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fear that initiating a search will ultimately result in dispossession
without compensation. 9 As potential buyers research the provenance
of the artwork, information about the artwork's whereabouts and its
current possessors will reach claimants, who will seek to negotiate a
settlement, file a lawsuit, or both. 10
The fight to return Nazi-looted art was invigorated by the
publication of Lynn Nicholas' The Rape of Europa (1994) and Hector
Feliciano's The Lost Museum (1997). 11 News of lawsuits filed in the
12
late 1990s seeking compensation for World War II-era slave labor,

Glenn D. Lowry, Director of the Museum of Modern Art, testified before the
9.
House Committee & Financial Services Committee about the nature of provenance
research:
In order to illustrate the complexity of the issues involved in this kind of work,
let me offer an example of the time and effort that must go into provenance
research. The Museum of Modern Art recently acquired a truly great painting,
The Window/The Yellow Curtain, by Henri Matisse. At first glance the painting
had an impeccable provenance having been in the great French collector
Alphonse Kann's collection before the war. During our research on the
painting, however, we learned that it had been confiscated by the Nazis and
even appears in a war-time photograph of the Jeu de Paume, the Parisian
building used as a repository for looted art by the Nazis. Crestfallen, we ceased
to pursue the painting and alerted the dealer to the problem. But this is not the
end of the story. For subsequent research revealed that despite being looted,
the painting had been restored to Mr. Kann prior to his death, and that he in
turn had sold it to a European collector in the 1940s. In order to be sure that
this had happened, the Museum contacted the heirs through an intermediary
and obtained a letter from them assuring us that all was in order. This process
took over a year and a half despite the renown of both the painting and the
Kann collection. While this kind of intensive research is standard for all works
of art we acquire, I believe that it is the exception rather than the rule to be
able to so clearly document the history of such a work of art.

Elaine L. Johnston, Cultural Property and World War II: Implications for American
Museums, PracticalConsiderationsfor the Museum Administrator,SC40 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
29, 60-1 (1998) (reprinted testimony).
10.
For example, in the Alsdorf/Bennigson litigation, an heir of a woman whose
Picasso painting was looted by the Nazis learned of the current possessor's attempts to
sell the painting only after a potential buyer researched the painting's provenance
through the Art Loss Register. See Bennigson, 2004 WL 803616.
See LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE'S
11.
TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (Alfred A. Knopf ed.,

1994); HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAzI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE
WORLD'S GREATEST WORKS OF ART (Tim Bent & Hector Feliciano trans., Basic Books
2d ed. 1997).
12.
See, e.g., In re Austrian German Holocaust Litigation, 250 F.3d 156 (2d Cir.
2001) (approving dismissal of slave labor claimants' class action lawsuits after the U.S.
and German governments agreed to create foundation for their benefits).
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unpaid insurance policies, 13 bank accounts, 14 and stolen gold 15 led to
generally increased awareness about the remaining legal issues
pertaining to the Holocaust. Since these events and the adoption of
the Washington Principles in 1998,16 many major museums around
the world have dedicated significant resources to researching the
provenance of artworks with gaps seemingly related to World War
II.17 These museums are publishing their findings on the web, which
is searchable by claimants. Organizations dedicated to locating looted
art, such as the Art Loss Register, are taking similar steps.1 8 Some
museums have reached creative settlements with claimants. 19
Others, however, notably the Austrian Gallery and the Belvedere in
20
Vienna, have fought claims in U.S. courts.
In the United States, litigation of art theft issues has taken
various forms and is governed by varying standards of proof and
statutes of limitation. Of course, traditional civil litigation is one
option. On the whole, traditional civil litigation of art theft cases has
been quite positive for plaintiffs: most of those cases reach out-ofcourt settlements.2 1 Notably, some have an unfavorable view of U.S.
courts' openness to such claims. For example, some critics maintain

13.
See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (enjoining
enforcement of California statute authorizing law suits against foreign insurers that
had issued policies prior to World War II as preempted by federal executive foreign
affairs powers).
14.
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, No. LV-96-4849-ERK-MDG, 2000
WL 33241660 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2000), aff'd, 413 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2005).
15.
Id.
16.
On December 3, 1998, forty-four governments participating in the Washington
Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets adopted principles for "dealing with Nazi-looted art."
The principles are available on the web site run by the Commission for Looted Art in
Europe: http://www.lootedartcommission.comllootedart-washingtonprinciples.htm.
17.

For the first time in a very public way, major American institutions are
attempting to correct possible improper acquisitions relating to [the
WWII] era and to quell once and for all old claims, by posting on web
sites lists of objects that have gaps in provenance. As these sites
proliferate, some museums are entering negotiated settlements with
litigants or potential litigants in response to ownership claims that
otherwise might be defeated by traditional defenses like the statute of
limitations.

JESSICA L. DARRABY, ART, ARTIFACT & ARCHITECTURAL LAW § 6:116 (West 2002).
18.
Id.; Elizabeth Olson, Web Site Goes Online to Find Nazi-Looted Art, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2003, at E4; Art Loss Register available at http://www.artloss.com
Default.asp ("The Art Loss Register (ALR) is the world's largest private international
database of lost and stolen art, antiquities and collectibles that provides recovery and
search services to collectors, the art trade insurers and law enforcement through
technology and a professionally trained staff of art historians.").
19.
E.g., David D'Arcy, Viennese Family Sell Nazi Loot Cranach Back to North
Carolina Museum for Half Price, THE ARTNEWSPAPER.COM, available at
http://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/article.asp?idart=2116.
20.
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677; Portraitof Wally, 105 F. Supp. 2d 288.
21.
Kaye & Spiegler, supra note 1, at 3.
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that the New York courts-arguably the most liberal in the United
States because they employ the "demand and refusal" rule for
triggering the statute of limitations-have become a magnet for
22
ancient, unjustified claims.
The most contested issues in such cases tend to be the factual
accuracy of the claim of looting, statutes of limitation, and choice of
law. 23 As witnesses die and documents are lost, a plaintiff has greater
difficulty establishing ownership, while a defendant has an increased
24
ability to show prejudice from the delay under U.S. laches doctrine.
As time passes and art trades hands, it likely will become more
difficult for plaintiffs to win such cases. 25 Additionally, the applicable
statutes of limitation and repose available under the civil law of
European nations continue to run.26 Choice of law is often contested
because U.S. law is more favorable to plaintiffs than European laws
27
on statute of limitations issues.
Plaintiffs continue to file traditional civil actions seeking the
return of Nazi-looted artwork. In October 2004, a case was filed
against Elizabeth Taylor. That case was dismissed fairly quickly,
primarily because there was no evidence that the art was looted or

22.
Ashton Hawkins, et al., A Tale of Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable
Balance Between the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen
Art, 64 FoRDHAM L. REV. 49, 51 (1995):
Although the court in Guggenheim expressed a fear that a less "ownerfriendly" rule would turn New York into a haven for stolen art, its decision
instead threatens to turn New York into a haven for questionable litigation of
ancient claims, and thereby may have a chilling effect on legitimate art
transactions and art exhibitions in the state." (internal footnotes omitted).
See also Charles D. Webb, Jr., Whose Art is It Anyway? Title Disputes and Resolutions
in Art Theft Cases, 79 KY. L.J. 883, 893-94 (1990-91) (claiming due diligence rule will
encourage filing of stale claims); Richard Perez-Pefia, The Art-Law Center of the
Universe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1993, at B7 (describing New York as an attractive venue
for filing ancient stolen art claims).
23.
See Emily A. Maples, Note, Holocaust Art: It Isn't Always "FindersKeepers,
Losers Weepers": A Look at Art Stolen During the Third Reich, 9 TULSA J. COMP. INT'L
L. 355 (2001) (describing issues that arise during lost art cases); Stephan J.
Schlegelmilch, Note, Ghosts of the Holocaust: Holocaust Victim Fine Arts Litigation
and a Statutory Application of the Discovery Rule, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 87, 117
(1999) ("The publicity of such high profile cases, such as the Seattle [Art Museum] case,
will encourage plaintiffs with tangential and weak cases to sue museums, realizing
that public sentiment is likely to push the museum toward settlement.").
24.
See Maples, supra note 23 (providing a thorough general overview of the
hurdles plaintiffs typically face); see also Constance Lowenthal, Edited Presentation,31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 133, 137 (1998) ("1Olne of the most important obstacles to
recovery for Holocaust victims has been proof. Holocaust victims who fled their
apartments usually had only their own recollections of their possessions..
25.
Lowenthal, supra note 24, at 137.
26.
Maples, supra note 23, at 367-68.
27.
E.g., id.
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subjected to a forced sale. 28 Additionally, Ed Fagan-famous for his
role in the Holocaust slave labor class actions in New Yorkreportedly filed an $18 billion suit against Germany and a $1.8 billion
suit against Sotheby's, publicly stating that he planned to file similar
suits against the United States, Austria, and France. 29 Regardless of
the viability of those particular suits, traditional civil litigation is a
viable option in many Nazi-looted art cases. Indeed, the Altmann
case, prior to entering arbitration, was litigated 30all the way to the
Supreme Court in 2004, albeit on narrow grounds.
Criminal prosecution is another possible option. At the federal
level, art theft is prosecuted criminally under the National Stolen
Property Act (NSPA).31 The NSPA was initially passed to address the
problem of stolen cars that were moved in interstate commerce: prior
to its enactment, prosecutors in the state where cars were stolen were
powerless to prosecute the thieves after they drove the stolen cars
across state lines. 3 2 Of course, criminal prosecutions are governed by
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, whereas most traditional
civil litigation is governed by the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard.
In addition to civil actions and criminal prosecutions, civil
forfeiture is another mechanism that may be used to recover stolen
art. 33 The civil forfeiture mechanism operates as a hybrid of criminal
and civil proceedings. 34 In the types of civil forfeiture proceedings
most applicable to stolen art, the government seizes the art and must
then show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 35 that the art is
subject to forfeiture because it was imported, transported, or received
in violation of some law (probably the NSPA or a customs
regulation). 36 Those who claim ownership of the art-regardless of

Adler v. Taylor, No. CV 04-8472-RGK (FMOx), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5862
28.
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2005).
29.
See Germany Sued over Holocaust Art, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS ONLINE,
June 24, 2004, http://web.archive.org/web/20040624024319/http://www.wjc.org.il/dwb/
archive.cfm?y=2004&m=6; Sotheby's Looted Art Lawsuit, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS
ONLINE, June 7, 2004, http://web.archive.org/web120040624024319/http://www.wjc.
org.illdwb/archive.cfm?y=2004&m=6.
30.
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2314, 2315 (2005). Trafficking in looted antiquities also
31.
commonly is prosecuted via customs statutes. E.g., U.S. v. An Antique Platter of Gold,
Known as a Gold Phiale Mesamphalos, C.400 B.C., 991 F. Supp. 222, 229-33 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
George W. Nowell, American Tools to Control the Illegal Movement of
32.
Foreign OriginArcheological Materials:Criminal and Civil Approaches, 6 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 77, 89-91 (1978).
33.
See Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Validity, Construction, and Application of the
Civil Asset ForfeitureReform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), 145 A.L.R. FED. 349 (2004).
Id.
34.
35.
Id.
For example, in Portraitof Wally, the U.S. government seeks forfeiture
36.
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1595(a) and 22 U.S.C. § 401(a). 105 F. Supp. 2d 288.
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whether they possessed the art immediately prior to the seizuremay then assert that the art should not be forfeited to the
37
government, but rather should be awarded to them.
"[T]he complexities of ownership issues sometimes result in more
than one party having colorable and good faith claims to title. 38
Additionally, because a violation of the NSPA occurs only when the
defendant acted "knowingly,"39 there is a scienter component, which
means that the government must prove that the violation was
intentional. 40 Further, as with most U.S. penal statutes, conspiracy to
41
violate the NSPA is also a crime.
This Article analyzes the patchwork of legal remedies available
to persons claiming ownership of Nazi-looted art. This Article
demonstrates that the use of the NSPA via criminal prosecutions or
civil forfeiture proceedings provides a claimant with great advantages
over the present-day possessors of the art. Part II analyzes the
criminal remedies used to punish thieves and restore the art to its
original owners or their heirs. Part III analyzes the use of the civil
forfeiture mechanism-a hybrid of criminal and civil remedies-in
pursuit of restoring art to claimants.
Part IV concludes that criminal prosecutions or civil forfeiture
proceedings premised on violations of the NSPA should be broughtmost often, but not exclusively-in the limited circumstance of a
clear, usually recent, theft. The NSPA is a criminal statute and
should only be applied--even indirectly through civil forfeiture
proceedings-to truly criminal conduct. For many claims to
purportedly stolen art, traditional civil litigation is a viable option
that is preferable to government-backed forfeiture proceedings, which
preempt statute of limitations principles upon which the viability of
the art market greatly depends. Although since the adoption in 2000
of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA) the advantages to
the government in a civil forfeiture proceeding are no longer quite as
extreme as they once were, 42 they still are weighty. Moreover, the
risk of erroneous deprivation is extremely high when ownership turns
on complex legal and factual issues that span many years. The
government should initiate criminal or civil forfeiture proceedings
only when there is probable cause to believe that notice of criminal
conduct at the time of acquisition is attributable to the current
possessor of the art, and when the current claimant is unable to
locate the art shortly after the theft. Otherwise, the government

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See infra Section III.
Am. Ass'n of Museums Br., at 3.
Nowell, supra note 32, at 99-101.
Id.
E.g., Am. Ass'n of Museums Br., at 5.
See Van Arsdale, supranote 33.
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should limit its involvement to assisting in negotiating a settlement,
or it should leave the claimants to pursue traditional civil remedies.

II. STOLEN ART CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Only a few criminal cases- have been filed on the grounds of art
theft. The NSPA-passed in 193443 as an extension of the National
Motor Vehicle Act of 1919 44-has been the basis for almost all
reported criminal prosecutions of art theft in the United States. The
NSPA is subdivided into two sections: 2314 and 2315. Section 2314
provides in relevant part:
Whoever transports, transmits or transfers in interstate or foreign
commerce any goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money, of the
value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen or taken
by fraud .... [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
45
than ten years or both.

Section 2315 provides in relevant part:
Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes
of any goods . . . of the value of $5,000 or more ... which have crossed a
State or United States boundary after being stolen, unlawfully
converted, or taken, knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully
converted, or taken... [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than ten years or both.

In sum, the two sections aim to prevent the knowing transport or
receipt of stolen goods. Because a defendant must have acted
"knowingly" to be convicted under the NSPA, there is a scienter
component, 4 6 which means that the government must prove that the
violation was intentional; 47 this will be discussed in further detail

See Nowell, supra note 32, at 89-91 (providing a full description of the
43.
legislative history of the NSPA).
18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1992).
44.
18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994). The statute also provides in part potentially
45.
relevant to international art theft:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, transports or causes to be transported,
or induces any person or persons to travel in, or to be transported in interstate
or foreign commerce in the execution or concealment of a scheme or artifice to
defraud that person or those persons of money or property having a value of
$5,000 or more ... [sihall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
ten years or both.

Id.
46.
47.

E.g., Nowell, supra note 32, at 99-101.
E.g., id.
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to
below. Additionally, as with most U.S. penal statutes, conspiracy
48
violate either section of the NSPA is a criminal violation.
"Until the early 1970s, because of the difficulty in proving the
scienter element, the prosecution of possessors of stolen art was only
49
a theoretical deterrent to art theft."
Proving scienter in stolen art cases is normally more difficult than for
other commercial goods. This difficulty is a function of the nature of the
art transaction itself. Often, the exchange of art objects is made
through art dealers and auction houses who take very few measures to
verify the provenance of the artwork. This lack of procedural
safeguards makes it difficult to show a legitimate chain of title. Thus,
more often than not, stolen artwork resurfaces on the legitimate
50
market with the purchaser unaware of its illicit background.

The first criminal conviction under the NSPA that related to art
was United States v. Hollinshead in 1974. 5 1 Hollinshead, a dealer in
pre-Columbian artifacts, and Fell, the owner of a Guatemalan
company used as a fence, smuggled artifacts out of Guatemala into
the United States. 52 They were convicted under the NSPA of, among
other things, conspiracy to transport property in interstate
commerce. 53 The prosecution focused in particular on the smuggling
of one spectacular Mayan stele 54 worth thousands of dollars, which
was cut into pieces, brought to Fell's packing plant in Belize, and
then "packed in boxes and marked 'personal effects' and addressed to
Hollinshead at Santa Fe Springs, California. '55 Evidence introduced
at trial proved that Hollinshead and Fell were present while the
events occurred and were also present while Guatemalan officers
were bribed to allow the stele's smuggling. 56 Ultimately, Hollinshead
himself attempted to sell the stele in the United States.5 7 After they
were found guilty, 5 8 Hollinshead and Fell appealed the jury's

48.
E.g., United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter
McClain 1], conviction on retrial upheld by United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th
Cir. 1979) [hereinafter McClain IA].

49.
Claudia Fox, Note, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects: An Answer to the World Problem of llicit Trade in Cultural
Property, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 225, 233 (1993) (citing PAUL M. BATOR, THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 68-69 (1981) (noting that difficulties in proving that an

object was stolen hindered the prosecution of art thieves)).
50.
Id.
51.
495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
52.
Id. at 1155.
53.
Id.
54.
"An upright slab bearing sculptured designs or inscriptions. Sometimes
loosely applied to any prepared surface on the face of a building, a rock, etc., covered
with an inscription." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
55.
Hollinshead, 495 F.2d at 1155.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
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verdict. 5 9 Notably, Hollinshead began as a civil suit brought by the
Guatemalan government, but Guatemala dropped the civil suit when
60
the U.S. Attorney initiated criminal proceedings under the NSPA.
An important issue on appeal was whether the jury instruction
that "there is a presumption that every person knows what the law
forbids" was overbroad when foreign law was at issue. 6 1 In
instructing the jury, the trial judge defined the term "stolen" as used
in the NSPA as follows: 'Stolen' means acquired, or possessed, as a
result of some wrongful or dishonest act or taking, whereby a person
willfully obtains or retains possession of property which belongs to
another, without or beyond any permission given, and with the intent
to deprive the owner of the benefit of ownership."6 2 The judge further
instructed the jury, as one would expect in a criminal case under the
NSPA, that "it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that
63
the... [criminal defendants] knew that the stele had been stolen."
Guatemalan law provides that all artifacts like the stele "are the
property of the Republic, and may not be removed without the
'6 4
permission of the government.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that there was
"overwhelming evidence that the defendants knew that it was
contrary to Guatemalan law to remove the stele, and that the stele
was stolen. ' 65 In fact, the court concluded that it would have been
"astonishing if the jury had found that they did not know that the
stele was stolen," regardless of any confusion the jury may have had
as to whether the controlling law was that of Guatemala or whether
Guatemalan law was enforceable in the United States. 66 Further, the
court found that the criminal defendants' knowledge of foreign law
was "relevant only to the extent that it bears upon the issue of their
knowledge that the stele was stolen. '67 In sum, the defendants'
conduct-bribing officials and using false marks on the stele's
packaging to smuggle it into the United States-evidenced beyond
any reasonable doubt that they knew they were smuggling "stolen"
property into the United States, which is a clear violation of the
NSPA.

59.
60.

Id.
Richard Upton, Art Theft: National Stolen Property Act Applied to

Nationalized Mexican Pre-Columbian Artifacts, 10 INT'L L. & POLITICS 569, n.102
(1978) (citing LEONARD D. DUBOFF, ART LAW: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 332

(Leonard D. Duboff ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1975)).
Hollinshead, 495 F.2d at 1155.
61.
62.
Id. at 1156.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
Id. at 1155.
65.
Id.
66.
67.
Id. at 1156.
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The second criminal conviction under NSPA was United States v.
McClain in 1977. Notably the defendants in McClain had connections
to Hollinshead. 68 In McClain, five defendants were found guilty of
violating the NSPA for stealing pre-Columbian artifacts from Mexico
and selling them in the United States. 69 A Mexican law passed in
1972 nationalized ownership of pre-Columbian artifacts still in the
ground. 70 Thus, a "distinctive characteristic of these objects is that
not only may they never have been in governmental possession, but
their very existence or discovery may have been unknown to the
Mexican government."' 71 Arguably, however, artifacts unearthed prior
72
to the passage of the Mexican law in 1972 are beyond its scope.
73
records relating to pre-Columbian art became
Thus, provenience
74
looking to buy and sell such art.
those
to
important
very
The actions of the defendants in McClain indicated beyond a
reasonable doubt that they knew that they were smuggling "stolen"
property. Although the government "presented no evidence as to how
and when the artifacts were acquired in Mexico, nor as to when the

68.
McClain I, 545 F.2d 988. See generally Upton, supra note 60, at 569-78
(discussing McClain 1). For the connection with Hollinshead, see 593 F.2d at 663.
McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 992. This opinion is cited solely for factual matters
69.
in the case. This opinion actually reverses the conviction below and remanded the case
for a new trial. The conspiracy count conviction in the retrial was affirmed on
subsequent appeal in McClain II, 593 F.2d at 658.
70.
McClain I, 545 F.2d at 992.
Upton, supranote 60, at 571 (footnotes and citations omitted):
71.
The potential chilling effect of the McClain decision on the acquisition and
circulation of pre-Columbian materials within the United States is enormous.
Since most American collections of pre-Columbian art contain items lacking
any reliable provenance, the McClain convictions set a precedent which would
expose museum trustees to the risk of federal criminal prosecution if the
museum arranges an interstate loan of pre-Columbian objects. Furthermore, it
is questionable whether this decision will have any offsetting beneficial effect
in deterring the burgeoning black market in pre-Columbian artifacts.
72.
See McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 992 (Ownership of pre-Columbian art unearthed
in Mexico was vested in the Republic of Mexico unless it issued "a license or permit to
private persons to possess, transfer, or export the artifacts." In effect, enforcing this
standard in the United States "casts a cloud on the title of almost every pre-Columbian
object in the United States.").
73.

The term "provenience" is used to indicate the history of an
archaeological object back to its archaeological find spot. The presence of
a documented provenience will indicate the original archaeological
context and associated materials and strata. "Provenance" has been used
to indicate the modern history of the ownership of an object.

Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition of Museum Collections and the
Fiduciary Obligations of Museums to the Public, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 409,
446 n.156 (2003).
74.
See McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 1003 (discussing confusion of ownership with
possession of pre-Columbian artifacts).
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pieces were exported," 75 the artifacts "had not been registered with
the Public Register of Archeological and Historical Zones and
Monuments of the Republic of Mexico, or with any government
'76
register, and were exported without license into the United States.
The defendants attempted to sell the artifacts to members of the art
and museum community-some viewing the artifacts in motel
rooms- 77 as well as to an undercover FBI agent. 78 "[S]ome of the
defendants made statements showing that they were aware that
Mexican law forbade the exportation of artifacts without permits from
79
the Mexican government.
For example, when one potential buyer viewing artifacts caked
in mud and straw asked one of the defendants, Rodriguez, how he
obtained the ancient artifacts, Rodriguez responded that "he had five
squads working in various archeological zones and that the objects
were passed, a few at a time 'by contraband' to his Calexico store,
which served as a front for his operation. '80 Rodriguez further
explained that "the prices had gone up as a result of the February
1972 presidential agreement between the United States and
Mexico" 81 by which the United States agreed to assist Mexico in
82
stemming the black market demand for pre-Columbian artifacts.
Further, the defendants told a potential buyer "that the items had
been 'stolen' or 'smuggled' out of Mexico ...[and that Rodriguez] was
'chief of the Mexican Secret Service' and had gotten the artifacts from
'a vault' in Mexico. 8 3 The defendants also described a plan to
generate false bills of sale in Europe so as to improve the
84
marketability of the pieces.
Further, after an informant contacted the defendants by phone
claiming to represent "an international combine with Mafia or other
underworld connections" looking to purchase stolen property to sell
outside the United States, one member of the conspiracy responded
favorably that the defendants were "waiting for a shipment of preColumbian artifacts to cross the border. 85 Telephone conversations
with other defendants leading up to the sting sale were similar. 86 One
defendant, William Clark Simpson, "described a 'conduit' by which
the items were taken from the diggings to the archeological institute

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 992.
Id.
McClain II, 593 F.2d at 660.
McClain I, 545 F.2d at 992-93.
Id. at 993.
McClain II, 593 F.2d at 660.
Id.
19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-95 (2005) (enacted in 1972).
McClain II, 593 F.2d at 660.
Id.
Id. at 661.
Id.
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in Mexico, where documents or permits were forged or backdated. 8 7
He also described how the items were then "trucked in disguise"
88
across the border.
Another example of the conspirators' knowledge that they were
smuggling "stolen" materials is that defendant Simpson stated to an
informant "that what they were doing 'is illegal, but really not illegal,
because if the Mexican authorities knew basically what [they] were
doing, they would take [the items] away from [them], because the
Mexicans really claim all of the items belong to them."'8 9 Simpson
also explained how backdating was being used to contravene the 1972
Mexican law. 90 In arranging the final sale, which was the sting,
Simpson reminded the potential purchasers of the need for discretion
and of the Mexican government's claim of ownership of the items,
stating that "they would get into a lot of problems if the United States
government caught them since what they were doing was against the
law." 91 Simpson's wife also cautioned an undercover potential buyer
not to show any sample artifacts from the operation to any art dealers
or museums because a "recent similar showing had caused the FBI to
investigate."92 She also requested that the buyer not bring in an
appraiser from Mexico City because "she was afraid he might return
and report their doings to the authorities because 'what [they] are
basically doing is against the law."' 93 The Fifth Circuit concluded that
these and other similar comments demonstrated beyond a reasonable
doubt that the conspirators knew that the art in question was "stolen"
as that term is used in the NSPA.
Nonetheless, both the Hollinshead and McClain decisions were
criticized by many who claimed that, in both cases, U.S. courts
improperly enforced the penal laws or the export regulations of other
nations, or both. 94 Many also claimed that a consequence of the
decision would be to encourage growth of the black market rather
than a responsible, regulated market, in antiquities. 95 In other words,

87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
Id.
91.
Id. at 662.
92.
93.
Id.
94.
E.g., John H. Merryman, The Free International Movement of Cultural
Property,31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 10 (1998).
95.
See, e.g., Upton, supra note 60, at 602-03 (discussing the weakness of the
McClain opinion due to the failure to address whether this is an unwarranted
enforcement of Mexican law). For discussion of the applicability of foreign law in
regards to the importation of art, see generally Kavita Shrama, Note, From the Mayan
Machaquila Stele to Egyptian Pharaoh Amenhotep's Head: United States Courts'
Enforcement of Foreign National Patrimony Laws after United States v. Schultz, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 749 (2005); Paul M. Bator, International Trade in National Art
Treasures: Regulation and Deregulation, in DUBOFF, ART LAW, DOMESTIC AND
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critics maintained that enforcing foreign law criminalizing the export
of any and all artifacts, rather than limiting the export prohibition to
a narrower class of objects, would generate a black market in "art
hungry"96 nations. 97 Further, the legislative history of the NSPA
indicates that Congress did not contemplate that the Act would be
98
applied to the theft of archeological materials in foreign nations.
"Congress intended the NSPA to reach organized criminals who steal
property in one state of the United States and sell it to persons in
different states."99 Nonetheless, the Hollinshead and McClain courts
found that the plain language of the NSPA applies broadly to stolen
goods, regardless of whether the goods are automobiles, cash, or
archeological materials stolen in another country. 10 0 As stated by the
Fifth Circuit in McClain: "It would have been impossible for the
statutes to have explicitly described every type of theft that might fall
within their purview." 10 1 The court concluded: "[I]t is not 'unfair to
require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of
102
proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line."'
At least one scholar cautioned, in reference to McClain, that the
case would have "potentially staggering ramifications for any art
collector and for owners of any other type of foreign-origin
property." 10 3 Although that fear may have been correct, no possessors

INTERNATIONAL 295, 300 (1975); John Merryman, The Protection of Artistic National
Patrimony against Pillaging and Theft, in DUBOFF, ART LAW, DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL 233,244-45 (1975); Rogers & Cohen, Art Pillage-International
Solutions, in DUBOFF ART LAW 315, 317-18 (1975); James A.R. Nafziger, Controlling
the Northward Flow of Mexican Antiquities, 7 LAW OF THE AM, 68, 71 (1975); Rogers,
Note, The Legal Response to the Illicit Movement of Cultural Property, 5 LAW & POL'Y
IN INT'L Bus. 932, 958-63 (1973). But see Patty Gersteblith, The Public Interest in the
Restitution of Cultural Objects, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 197 (2000) (approving expansive
use of the NSPA); Barbara B. Rosencrance, Note, Harmonious Meeting: The McClain
Decision and the Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 311
(1986) (same); Jonathan S. Moore, Note, Enforcing Foreign Ownership Claims in the
Antiquities Market, 97 YALE L.J. 466 (1988) (same).
96.
E.g., Jordana Hughes, Note, The Trend Toward Liberal Enforcement of
Repatriation Claims in Cultural PropertyDisputes, 33 G.W. INT'L L. REV. 131, 150-51
(2000).
97.
See William G. Pearlstein, Claims for the Repatriationof Cultural Property:
Prospects for a Managed Antiquities Market, 28 LAW & POLY INT'L BUS. 123, 128-29
(1996).
98.
Nowell, supra note 32, at 89 ("Despite the apparent ease with which the
statute may seem to apply to foreign archaeological materials, the NSPA was drafted
to deal with a very different problem, namely, theft of standard, modern commercial
goods clearly 'owned' and 'possessed' by some person or corporation before their theft.").
99.
Id. at 89.
100.
See also United States v. Shultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d. Cir. 2003) (holding that
the NSPA applies to stolen property from a foreign government).
101.
McClain I, 545 F.2d at 1002.
102.
Id. at 1002 n.30 (quoting Boyce Motor Lines v. U.S., 342 U.S. 337, 340
(1952)).
103.
Upton, supra note 60, at 571.
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10 4
of Nazi-looted art have been convicted for their purchases.
Moreover, there has been only one other criminal prosecution under
the NSPA in the context of stolen archeological materials: United
States v. Schultz.
The eleven-day Schultz trial in June 2002 was widely followed in
the art community 0 5 and was the subject of Indiana Jones-like
stories in the print and television media. 10 6 Frederick Schultz was a
Manhattan art dealer who sold exquisite antiquities worth many
millions of dollars-many of which, it has come to be revealed, he
smuggled out of Egypt. 0 7 Aided by British national, Tokely Parry,
and Egyptian black marketer, Ali Ibrahim Alia Farag, Schultz
smuggled newly unearthed antiquities out of Egypt in violation of
Egypt's patrimony law, Law 117.108 Law 117 was passed in 1983 and
provides that all antiquities still in the ground belong to the nation of
Egypt and may not be exported from the country.'0 9 The law,
however, applies only to those antiquities unearthed after 1983.110
To get around Law 117, the conspirators would buy newly
unearthed antiquities at black market prices from tomb-raiders,
building contractors, and corrupt Egyptian officials."' It was
important for the smuggling scheme that the antiquities be newly
discovered because tombs previously discovered would have been
described and published in academic journals. 112 "Claiming that an
antiquity came out of Egypt [decades before 1983] clearly would have
been problematic if there was a publication that recorded the
antiquity as having been discovered in a tomb in Egypt [after
then]. 11 3 To explain further, Parry and Schultz "needed the [objects]
to be from an unpublished tomb, so that the Egyptian Government
could not identify them as having been removed from Egypt in the
114

recent past."

104.
As discussed below, the Department of Justice initiated a prosecution of the
family of serviceman Joe T. Meador, but the case was dismissed. Meador stole the
Quedlinburg treasures after the war and shipped them to his home in rural Texas. See
infra text accompanying notes 153-61.
105.
See, e.g., Last Shot for Schultz, ARCHAEOLOGY, May 29, 2003, available at
http://www.archaeology.org/online/features/schultz/briefs.html (discussing Shultz).
106.
See, e.g., Barry Meier & Martin Gottlieb, An Egyptian artifact takes a
crooked path Stolen Treasures, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 24, 2004, at NewsA, 2004
WLNR 5188944.
107.
Brief for the United States of America, United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d
393 (2d Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1357), available at 2002 WL 32395393.
108.
Id.
109.
Id. at *3.
Id.
110.
111.
Id. at *2.
112.
Id. at *9-*12.
113.
Id.
114.
Id. at * 10 (trial transcript citation omitted).
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To further their scheme, Parry "created false provenances of [the
objects'] origin, to make it appear as if they had been removed from
Egypt long before the enactment of Law 117." 115 The court
summarized the scheme as follows:
Tokely Parry, a skilled restorer of antiquities, restored several of the
pieces using techniques from the 1920's. Schultz then offered the stolen
antiquities for sale at his art gallery lo~ated on Madison Avenue, which
specialized in Classical, Egyptian, Near Eastern, Early European and
Eskimo antiquities. Schultz falsely told prospective buyers that the
antiquities came from old private collections predating Law 117including the fictitious 'Thomas Alcock 1 16 Collection," named after a
long-deceased great uncle of Tokely Parry-and succeeded in selling
one piece, a 3,000-year old stone head of an Egyptian pharaoh
[Amenhotep 111],117 for $1.2 million. 1 1 8

For example, one of the smuggling techniques involved
disguising an object "by plastering it with a conservation plastic and
painting it to look like a tourist souvenir," 119 which then could easily
be carried out of Egypt in a suitcase. 120 Then, after restoring the
object, Parry would adhere to the object a Victorian pharmaceutical
label stained with tea bags to make it look old and marked with the
12 1
name of an old collection, like the Thomas Alcock Collection.
In addition to creating old collection labels, Tokely Parry restored the
[Amenhotep III head] imitating a restoration style that was popular in
the 1920's. He painted the entire head with a coat of brown shellac (a
varnish used at the time), and used plastic modeling material to fill in a
false nose, beard and uraeus (a sacred cobra appearing on the
forehead). He then photographed the head in this condition and
provided these photographs to Schultz, along with a phony restoration
report describing what he purportedly did, as a modern restorer, to
122
remove the old restoration.

The scheme did not come crashing down until more than two
years after Parry was arrested by New Scotland Yard in 1994 for
smuggling Egyptian antiquities seemingly unrelated to Schultz's
scheme. 123 In fact, the pair continued smuggling for two years after
the arrest, although they took additional steps to try to hide their

115.

Id. at *3.

116.
Thomas Alcock was an engineer who worked in India and often traveled
down the Suez Canal. Id. at *6.
117.
"Amenhotep III was the king of Egypt from approximately 1390 to 1352
B.C., which was during the 18th dynasty of the period known as the New Kingdom.
This was one of Egypt's most wealthy and powerful times." Id. at *5 (citation to trial
transcript omitted).
118.
Id. at *4.
119.
Id. at *5.
120.
Id.

121.

Id. at *6.

122.
Id. at *6-*7 (internal citations omitted).
123.
Id. at *14. Additionally, Schultz was fully aware that Ali Farag and
members of his family were charged in Egypt with dealing in stolen antiquities. Id.
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activities. 124 At trial, evidence of the above-described events was
presented. Other evidence demonstrating that Schultz knew that he
was violating Law 117-such as a letter he received from Parry about
other pieces of lesser value that were used in their efforts to make the
existence of an old collection seem believable-was presented; it is
likely that no collection would consist solely of prime pieces of
extremely high value. 125 In the letter, Parry wrote
I spoke with Ali about the pair of reliefs and he assured me that the
tomb is completely unknown to the government. So although you would
probably prefer anyway to go through with your search, I'm certain that
there will be no problems about these pieces. I'm sufficiently content
12 6
about this to send over some Thorn Alcock labels for them.

Other similar letters and faxes demonstrated Schultz's
knowledge that Law 117, at a minimum, made it illegal to export
recently discovered antiquities out of Egypt without governmental
approval. 127 For example, in a letter requesting money to continue
funding the operation, Parry informed Schultz that
the boys have just returned from the hills above Minea [a large city in
central Egypt known for its volume of archeological materials], which is
bandit country ...and we are offered a large hoard. It should be
possible to flip some items over, and take the ones you would prefer, but
1 28
we shall need more money to put down.

Another letter stated that a particular piece was
lost to us because, simply, we didn't have any money there to put down
a deposit and secure it (that is, physically take it away from the
farmer.) I'm immensely depressed about this, as the piece would have
solved all our problems... We managed, however, with considerable
skill, to keep our customer who, it seems, is sitting on a temple. We
have told him that we need another important piece, and he has agreed
29
to actively dig for one. 1

In another letter specifically informing Schultz of legal
developments concerning the Egyptian stolen antiquities market,
Parry wrote:
130
incarceration
Market here has changed dramatically after Simone's
and Tariq's retirement for one year ...Also, new legislation is inclining
all the farmers to sell their collections: anyone found with objects-and

124.
Id. at *11. Further, "Tokely Parry was convicted after a trial in England of
violations of the 1968 Theft Act for the secondary handling of stolen antiquities. He
served approximately three years in prison, from 1997 to 2000. Tokely Parry testified
without any cooperation agreement or other agreement with U.S. or British
authorities." Id. at *10 (internal citation to trial transcript omitted).
Id. at *12.
125.
126.
Id. at *9.
127.
Id. at *16.
128.
Id. at *17.
129.
Id. at *18.
130.
Id. Simone was an antiquities dealer arrested in Egypt.
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classifiable as a 'dealer' thereby-will have his entire assets (house,
funds, bank accounts etc. seized).1 3 1

In other letters, Parry wrote that he feared going to prison. 13 2 Near
the end, their communications were written in Italian-in code-so
that hotel workers would not understand them. 133 Finally, one fax
13 4
instructed Schultz to eat the fax after he read it.
Schultz challenged his conviction on many grounds, including
many that were advanced in McClain and by scholars who criticized
McClain.135 Schultz's first argument was that the NSPA did not
extend to the taking of antiquities in violation of foreign nations'
laws, regardless of whether the law was an anti-export law or a
national patrimony law declaring ownership of all newly discovered
antiquities in the state. 136 This argument was squarely rejected by
the Fifth Circuit in McClain in the opinion written by Judge
Wisdom 13 7 and by the Second Circuit in Schultz. The Second Circuit
stated that the
McClain court's conclusion is firmly anchored in the text and purpose of
the NSPA, which, by its terms, applies to any goods that enter the
United States after having been stolen abroad, and which has
consistently been given a broad interpretation by the Supreme Court
and this Court. Since McClain was decided, every court to have reached
the issue has agreed with the Fifth Circuit's analysis; the relevant
agencies of the Executive Branch have endorsed its conclusion as
consistent with the best interests of the United States; and Congress
has repeatedly rebuffed efforts to amend the NSPA to create the very
138
exception that Schultz asks be read into the statute [for art dealers].

131.
Id.
132.
Id. at *18.
133.
Id. at *19.
134.
Id. at *19.
135.
See Cynthia Ericson, United States of America v. Frederick Schultz: The
National Stolen Property Act Revives the Curse of the Pharaohs, 12 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 509, 511 (2004) (discussing the McClain/Schultz line of cases).
136.
Schultz, 2002 WL 32395393 at *23.
137.
McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 988.
138.
Schultz, 2002 WL 32395393 at *23; see also Upton, supra note 60, at 570
(criticizing McClain's application of the NSPA to prosecution for objects taken in
violation of foreign national patrimony regimes); Paul M. Bator testified in May 1985
on Bill 86-S521-56 that the NSPA should return to "its intended framework-that is,
cases of real theft, where it is shown and proved that somebody took something from
somebody else's ownership, and it is a real ownership not simply one of these abstract
vesting statutes saying that everything belongs to the State." Last Shot for Schultz?:
Battle of the Briefs, ARCHAEOLOGY, May 29, 2003, http://www.archaeology.org/online/
features/schultz/briefs.html; see also Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International
Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275 (1982); Schultz, 2002 WL 32395593 at *28
(discussing Congressional hearings on proposed bills advocating amendment of the
NSPA in light of McClain, which bills never were sent out of committee to the full
Congress for voting). The Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury all sent
representatives to testify at hearings in opposition to the bills. Id.
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Schultz further argued that applying the NSPA to his conducttaking objects in contravention of the national patrimony laws of a
foreign nation-violated the principle of strict construction and the
rule of lenity in criminal cases. 139 Both the Fifth Circuit in McClain
and the Second Circuit in Schultz rejected similar arguments on very
similar facts. 140 The principles of strict construction and lenity
generally provide that criminal statutes shall be strictly construed "to
141
ensure a defendant has fair warning that his conduct is criminal.'
The Schultz court rejected this line of argument, finding that the
statute was clear and that "Schultz cannot credibly complain that he
lacked fair warning that his conduct was criminal" 142 in light of the
"obvious criminality of his conduct."'1 43 According to the court, the
NSPA "plainly prohibits the knowing receipt of stolen goods, and the
jury's verdict confirmed that Schultz received goods that he knew had
144
been stolen from Egypt."'
Thus, Schultz solidified application of the NSPA to theft
committed abroad when the stolen goods are brought into the United
States. The thefts in Hollinshead, McClain, and Schultz stood in
violation of foreign national patrimony statutes that clearly set forth
governmental ownership of newly discovered antiquities. The
defendants in all three cases clearly knew that their activities were
illegal-even if, as the defendants and some scholars have argued,
the defendants did not know necessarily that U.S. criminal law, or
the NSPA in particular, would categorize their conduct as "theft."
The Schultz court also concluded that, in these circumstances, it
was not unfair to satisfy the scienter component of the NSPA via
violations of foreign ownership laws. 145 "As the McClain court noted,
the NSPA's scienter requirement protects against 'the possibility that
a defendant is convicted for an offense he could not have understood

Schultz, 2002 WL 32395593 at *31-*35. See also Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S.
139.
207, 213 (1985) (holding that the meaning of "stolen, converted or taken by fraud" in
§ 2314 requires a "narrow interpretation").
140.
McClain I, 545 F.2d at 1002 n.30 (rejecting a similar argument based on
the "void for vagueness" doctrine).
141.
Schultz, 2002 WL 32395593 at *31.
142.
Id. at *32.
143.
Id.
144.
Id. The Schultz court also rejected the argument that because McClain was
criticized by many scholars that Schultz should thereby be exculpated for his conduct
because he did not know 100% whether other courts would follow McClain and find
that the NSPA applied to his conduct.
145.
Id. See also U.S. v. Tanuzzo, 174 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1949), cert denied,
338 U.S. 815 (1949); Nowell, supra note 33, at 100 (analyzing the potential confusion
created by the scienter requirement in the context of theft abroad as to whether
knowledge is required about illegal export as opposed to taking from an actual owner);
Upton, supra note 60, at 569.
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to exist.' 146 The Schultz court further noted that the McClain court
"addressed any due process concerns by requiring that foreign
national ownership laws declare ownership with 'sufficient clarity to
survive translation into terms understandable by and binding upon
American citizens.' 147 Enforcing the NSPA in this manner prevents
the United States from becoming a black market "for the fruits of
foreign grave robbery." 148 All of the defendants in Hollinshead,
McClain, and Schultz clearly knew that the goods in which they were
trafficking were "stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken. ' 14 9 More
particularized knowledge about the specific laws that could apply to
150
their wrongful acts is not required under the NSPA.
Nonetheless, as cautioned by McClain, "[tihough the National
Stolen Property Act is not void for vagueness because the general
class of offenses to which it is directed is plainly within its terms, it
cannot properly be applied to items deemed stolen only on the basis of
unclear pronouncements by a foreign legislature." 15 1 Thus, the NSPA

146.
Schultz, 2002 WL 32395593 at *26 (citing McClain I, 545 F.2d at 1001
n.30).
147.
Id. (citing McClain II, 593 F.2d at 670).
148.
Id. at *48 (citing the 1985 hearing testimony of a Justice Department
representative).
149.
18 U.S.C. § 2315.
150.
See Schultz, 2002 WL 32395393 at *71 (citing U.S. v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531,
1546 (2d Cir. 1994) (identifying "mens rea" element of § 2315 as simply 'knowing the
same to have been stolen"') (quoting § 2315); Goodwin v. U.S., 687 F.2d 585, 588 (2d
Cir. 1982) ("A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2315 normally requires simply the act of
receiving or disposing of stolen goods of the requisite value moving in interstate
commerce, coupled with knowledge that the goods are stolen."). "The statute is thus a
classic example of the type of statute that 'merely requires proof of knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense,' and not knowledge that the defendant's conduct
constitutes a crime." Id. (quoting Bryan v. U.S., 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998), citing
Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 426 n.9 (1985) (explaining that for crime of receipt of
stolen goods, it is not a defense that one did not know that the goods were stolen)); 1
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1(d) (1986)
(although crime of larceny is not committed if defendant mistakenly believed that the
property belonged to him, it is committed if defendant mistakenly believed that it was
lawful to take property e knew belonged to others because it was the custom of the
community to do so). It should be noted that McClain II was initially reversed on
appeal and remanded for a new trial because the Fifth Circuit found that "the
defendants may have suffered the prejudice of being convicted pursuant to laws that
were too vague to be a predicate for criminal liability under our jurisprudential
standards." 593 F.2d at 670. The lower court improperly instructed the jury that
Mexican law since 1897 vested ownership of Mexican cultural patrimony in the state,
when the law was not clear in this regard until 1972. Id. at 666. The court insisted that
the patrimony law must clearly vest ownership in the state and noted that it was
"loath to reverse a conviction such as this where the evidence of guilt and of intent to
violate both foreign and domestic law is near overwhelming." Id. at 670.
151.
McClain II, 593 F.2d at 671; see also Ann Brickley, Note, McClain
Untarnished: The NSPA Shines through the Phiale Controversy, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. OF
ART & ENT. L. 315, 351 (2000) ("The United States acknowledged the patrimony laws of
Mexico and Guatemala because they are clear, were in effect prior to the theft in
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applies to archeological artifacts stolen in nations with statutes
clearly vesting ownership of the objects in the state. Consequently, it
is unlikely that the NSPA could be presently applied in a criminal
prosecution to Nazi-looted art stolen sixty years ago that has since
been purchased by a bona fide purchaser-because a bona fide
purchaser, by definition, would not have had the requisite knowledge
that the object was stolen. A bona fide purchaser is "one who
purchased property from seller, honestly believing seller had right to
sell property, and absent any dubious circumstances that would put
buyer on notice to contrary. '152 Where one's status as a bona fide
purchaser is less than clear, however, the NSPA potentially could
apply, assuming that there is no statute of limitations bar.
For example, the Department of Justice initiated a criminal
prosecution against some family members of serviceman Joe T.
Meador, a former art teacher and U.S. soldier in World War 11.153
Meador stole the Quedlinburg treasures after the war and shipped
them wrapped in brown paper to his home in rural Texas. 15 4 The
Quedlinburg treasures were a "trove of gold, silver and bejeweled
medieval manuscripts [hidden in a cave during the war] near the
Quedlenburg Cathedral, their home for the previous 1,000 years." 155
One such treasure covered with precious stones is believed to have
belonged to Henry 1.156 The treasures have been described as "one of
57
the most important collections of religious art of the Middle Ages."'
After Meador died in 1980, his family sold some of the treasures,
which eventually attracted the attention of the German
government. 5 8 The German government reached a controversial
$2.75 million settlement with the family to secure the return of the

question, and because the objects were obviously taken from the present day
countries.") (citations omitted).
152.
LYNDEL V. PROTT & P.J. O'KEEFE, LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE VOL.
3: MOVEMENT 396-416 (1989).

153.
See, e.g., Peter Gillman, The Gospel Story, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 30, 1991, at
20-28 (describing Meador's theft). For detailed analyses of the case, see Constance
Lowenthal, Case Study: The Quedlinburg Church Treasures, in THE SPOILS OF WAR
148-58 (Elizabeth Simpson, ed. 1997).
154.
See Glenn Collins, New Hopes of Finding Lost and Looted Art, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 1990, at ClI. The Quedlinburg treasures were taken from a church of the
same name; they consisted of at least fourteen items, including a comb and a reliquary.
155.
Marcia Chambers, One Theft That Brought Big Rewards, THE NAT'L L.J.
13, Mar. 25, 1991, at 13.
156.
Claudia Fox, Note, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects: An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in Cultural
Property, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLy 225, 227 n. 11 (1993) (citing StifskircheDomgemeinde of Quedlinburg v. Meador, No. CA3-90-1440-D (N.D. Texas filed June
18, 1990)).
157.
William H. Honan, It's Finally Agreed: Germany to Regain a Stolen Trove,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1992, at C15 (quoting Klaus Maurice, the chief German negotiator
who arranged for their return to Quedlinburg).
158.
Chambers, supranote 155, at 13.
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treasures. 159 As part of the settlement, the German government
informed the Department of Justice that it did not wish for the family
members to be prosecuted. 160 Although a prosecution was initiated, it
eventually was dropped, and the family members were never
16 1
prosecuted in any court.
Many treasures seem to have been returned to claimants after
World War II, in part, because of fear of prosecution by those who
stole the objects and attempted to sell them. 162 According to Ely
Maurer, an assistant legal adviser for cultural property at the State
Department at the time of the Meador controversy, "in 300 cases the
State Department was able to identify looted objects that had been
'163
brought to the United States 'and bring about their restitution"
Additionally, "[aifter the war, the Army prosecuted 'dozens of soldiers
for taking stolen property and trying to sell it,"' putting the soldiers
in prison or giving them dishonorable discharges. 164 Interestingly,
'Meador had been court-martialed in 1945 after the Army found he
165
had stolen some valuable china from a French chateau."'
These criminal cases indicate that the continued prosecution of
people who loot archeological sites in nations that have enacted
national patrimony laws is likely, so long as the foreign law clearly
states that the nation is vested with ownership of the unearthed
objects. 166 A U.S. Attorney's Office, most likely one in New York or
California, 167 might also bring a NSPA prosecution against someone
who currently possesses Nazi-looted art if that person obtained the
art during, or shortly after, World War II and clearly knew it had

159.
Associated Press, Stolen Treasures Returning to German Church, L.A.
TIMES,Jan. 8, 1991.
160.
Honan, supra note 157, at C15 ('A lot of things can affect the decision to
prosecute,' the Justice Department official said. 'These are elderly people, hometown
people. It's not as if they were a couple of yuppies who would get much less sympathy,
.especially down here.").
161.
Id.
162.
See Collins, supra note 154, at Cll.
163.
Id.
164.
Id. (quoting Ely Maurer, The Role of the State Department Regarding

National and Private Claims for the Restitution of Stolen Cultural Property, in THE
SPOILS OF WAR 142 (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997)).
165.
Chambers, supra note 155, at 13.
See McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 1002 n.30 ("It poses the possibility, of course,
166.
that similar exportations from different countries might lead to different results in the
United States.").
167.
U.S. Attorneys in these two states have initiated civil forfeiture proceedings
against Nazi-looted art. See infra Part III.
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been stolen by a serviceman, "aryanized,"' 168 or sold at an infamous
1 69
"Jew auction."'
Where theft is unclear, however, prosecution does not seem
likely. 170 Theoretically, a modern prosecution would seem most likely
if the same person who looted the object transports it. The same may
be true, in very limited circumstances, if the descendants of someone
who knowingly purchased Nazi-looted art--or stole it during the
war-knew it was stolen but tried to sell it now. Most Nazi-looted
art, however, was sold long ago by those who stole it or purchased it
from Nazi collaborators. Much of it seems to have been bought by
museums, dealers, or individuals many, but certainly not all, of whom
have strong claims that they were bona fide purchasers without
knowledge that the artwork was looted.
As previously discussed, the NSPA criminal cases indicate that
"ownership" of an object will be determined according to the laws of
the nation where the object was acquired. As a general rule, civil-law
nations' laws as to bona fide purchasers' abilities to "get title from a
thief' are much more liberal than those in the United States. 171 For
example, the affidavit of French law experts in the Alsdorf v.
Bennigson declaratory judgment proceeding indicates that even
though France enacted a law nullifying Nazi forced sales of Jewish
property by 1945, the law also provided for a thirty-year statute of
repose to all claims applicable to moveable property, regardless of
172
whether the current possessor was a bona fide purchaser or not.
One can argue today that such a law is unfair, but U.S. standards of
due process would seem to preclude criminally prosecuting someone
for purchasing property in France, for example, more than thirty
years after it was stolen there. In the U.S. legal system, a key
problem with the "scienter" requirement would exist.
It seems that who qualifies as a "bona fide purchaser" would be
more liberally applied to those who purchased art, not during or
shortly after the war from dealers known to be Nazi collaborators, but
rather to those who purchased the art from the mid-1970s until 1994,
when Nicholas' The Rape of Europa brought the issue to the fore. In
contrast, if someone were to purchase art today when the relevant

168.
The term "aryanized property" refers to property that was owned by Jews
but which the Nazi regime forced Jewish owners to sell to an Aryan (as defined under
Nazi law), or where the property was confiscated from the Jewish owner and given to
an Aryan.
169.
NICHOLAS, supra note 11, at 23-25, 39-40 (describing the auctions known
as "Jew auctions" where the Nazis sold property expropriated from persecuted Jews).
170.
This Article does not attempt to analyze the criminal liability faced by an
employee of a museum-such as the director of the Leopold-claiming ownership of
allegedly aryanized art. See infra Part III.
171.
E.g., Thomas Kline, The Recovery of Stolen Art Sold in the United States
from a "Neutral"Country, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 243, 245 (1998).

172.

Compl. For Declaratory Judgment, Bennigson, 2004 WL 2806801.
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provenance information reveals that it had been sold shortly after the
war by a dealer known to have collaborated with the Nazis, it is
unlikely that such a person would qualify as a bona fide purchaser, at
least under U.S. laws. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that the legal
standards applicable to many such purchases would be sufficiently
;4clear"' to purchasers to satisfy the standard set out in the criminal
NSPA cases-that the foreign law clearly' vests ownership in someone
other than the purchaser.
In conclusion, because of the scienter requirement, although the
intent of the NSPA is to assist theft victims, 17 3 the Act's "application
[likely will continue to be] limited to cases involving easily proved
thefts,"1174 at least in regard to criminal prosecution. 175 If the looter or
possessor of the object moves it across a state line, the NSPA would
be triggered. The same may be true in very limited circumstances if
the descendants of someone who knowingly purchased Nazi-looted
art, or stole it outright during the war, knew it was stolen but tried to
sell it presently. In any event, it is doubtful that the legal standards
applicable to many such purchases would be sufficiently "clear" to
satisfy the standard set out in the criminal NSPA cases. 176 Because
sixty years now have passed since World War II, it seems unlikely,
but not impossible, that one in possession of Nazi-looted art today
would be prosecuted criminally under the NSPA.

III.

CIVIL FORFEITURE CASES-A HYBRID

A civil forfeiture proceeding is initiated by the government filing
a complaint that names specific property as the defendant, as opposed

173.
See McClain I, 545 F.2d at 996. Notably, "[alithough the McClain court
asserted that legislators intended the NSPA to protect owners of property worldwide,
the court did not support its assertion. No legislative materials dealing with the NSPA
mention foreign situs thefts," Nowell, supra note 32, at 92 n.72, except for "an
amendment to extend the NSPA to any [American-owned commercial] property seized
in violation of law or confiscated by a foreign government." Id. at 90 n.59 (citing
William J. Hughes, United States v. Hollinshead: A New Leap in Extraterritorial
Application of Criminal Laws, 1 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 149, 170 (1977).;
Extending the National Stolen Property Act to Confiscated Property:Hearings on H.R.
9669 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives, 77 Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); 86 Cong. Rec. 12971-98 (1940)).
Nowell, supra note 32, at 86-87.
174.
Cf. McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 1001 n.30; Schultz, 2002 WL 32395593 at *26
175.
(scienter discussion).
176.
The procedure for the government to return stolen objects to their rightful
owners is somewhat ambiguous. Upton, supra note 60, at 609 ("In addition, because
NSPA only addresses prosecution of the thief, the art objects which are the center of
the controversy are not returned automatically to the victim-owner. The owner must
bring a civil action against the artifacts themselves to recover them.") (internal
citations omitted); Jodi Patt, The Need to Revamp Current Domestic Protection for
CulturalProperty,96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1207, 1211-12 (2002).
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to a person who may have committed a crime to obtain the
property. 177 Typically the property is seized in an administrative
proceeding by the appropriate federal agency, such as the
Department of Treasury or FBI, prior to a U.S. Attorney's initiation of
civil proceedings. 178 The complaint filed by the U.S. Attorney's Office
states, with legal and factual support, the government's reasons for
seeking forfeiture of the property. 1 79 The proceeding then moves
along much like ordinary civil litigation, except that "[a]ny person
with a legal interest in the property who wishes to contest its
forfeiture has the right to do so and is entitled to a jury trial."' 8 0 The
civil forfeiture proceeding has significant advantages over criminal
proceedings for prosecutors:
The burden of proof is lower-'preponderance of the evidence' versus
'beyond a reasonable doubt.' But more importantly, civil forfeiture cases
do not require a criminal conviction and proceed independent of a
criminal trial. The government still must prove that a crime occurred
and that the property subject to forfeiture was involved in that crime,
but it does not have to put the wrongdoer himself on trial. That means
that the government... can use forfeiture to impose a civil penalty on a
person in a case that is serious, but not serious enough to justify a
181
criminal conviction.

"[T]he NSPA is not a forfeiture statute and has no forfeiture
provisions."'18 2 A violation of the NSPA nonetheless "may give rise to
forfeiture under, inter alia, 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) (permitting forfeiture
18 3
of merchandise imported into the United States 'contrary to law').'
Additionally, as discussed in more detail below, before the passage of
CAFRA in 2000, the government had a probable cause burden that
required a search warrant in criminal cases. l8 4 This practice was
widely criticized, which is a major reason for the enactment of
CAFRA. l8 5

177.
See, e.g., Stefan D. Cassella, Using the Forfeiture Laws to Protect
Archeological Resources, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 129, 132 (2004).
178.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.
181.
Id.
182.
Schultz, 333 F.3d at 409 (rejecting claim that CPIA forfeiture provisions,
which were not at issue in the case because the government was not seeking forfeiture
in the criminal action, superseded the NSPA in criminal cases based on illegal
importation of antiquities); see also U.S. v. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (citing U.S. v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1990); Bator, supra note
138, at 353) (extensive discussion of the issue).
183.
Schultz, 333 F.3d at 1109.
184.
Van Arsdale, supranote 33.
185.
E.g., H.R. 1658, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter H.R. 1658] (quoting U.S. v.
$12,390, 956 F.2d 801, 811 (8th Cir. 1992) (Beam, J., dissenting)).
Allowing property to be forfeited upon a mere showing of probable cause can be
criticized on many levels: "The government need not produce any admissible
evidence and may deprive citizens of property based on the rankest of hearsay
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This Section will analyze the two civil forfeiture proceedings filed
against Nazi-looted art and the changes brought about by CAFRA.
A. AustrianPost-War Efforts and Portrait of Wally
In one case in which the U.S. Attorneys' Office utilized the civil
forfeiture mechanism against the current possessor of Nazi-looted art,
the then-current possessor was an Austrian museum.18 6 The Austrian
government established programs after the war in an effort to return
aryanized property to its rightful owners pursuant to the Austrian
State Treaty of 1955.187 Under Article 26 of the Treaty:
Austria was obligated to restore the legal rights and interests of the
true owners of such property where possible ... [and] if property
remains unclaimed or heirless six months after the Treaty comes into
force, Austria "agrees to take under its control all [such] property" and
"transfer such property ... to the appropriate agencies or organizations
'188
to be used for relief and rehabilitation of victims of persecution."

The statutory framework contemplated that survivors or their
heirs would file claims with statutorily created Restitution
Commissions.1 8 9 "Restitution Commissions acted in panels, with a
professional judge presiding" to adjudicate claims. 190 "They were
established at each of the provincial courts in charge of the
administration of justice in civil matters."'19 1
The Bundesdenkmalamt (BDA) was an Austrian agency created
and authorized to collect property after the war for future processing
by the Restitution Commissions. 192 Under the Austrian Ban on
Export of Cultural Assets Code, the BDA had the shocking power to
"impede the return of artwork to successful claimants residing abroad
when it found that the 'public interest' required the preservation of
such cultural assets in Austria."'1 93 In determining whether to grant
the required export permits, the BDA often would consult with
Austrian museums about the quality of the works at issue. 194 "Often
the BDA would grant export approval for certain works of art on the

and the flimsiest of evidence. This result clearly does not reflect the value of
private property in our society, and makes the risk of erroneous deprivation
intolerable."
Id.
186.
9940, 2002
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

United States v. Portrait of Wally, A Painting by Egon Schiele, No 99-CVWL 553532, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002).
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1 n.1 (citing Friedrich Decl. 24).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2 n.2 (citing Friedrich Decl. 5n).
Id.
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condition that the owner would sell at a low price or make a gift of
other works of art to Austrian museums." 19 5 This extortion seems to
have been widespread, although, as discussed below, it does not seem
to have been commonly known to the international community until
the late-1990s.
In response to continued criticism that Austria had failed to
adequately restitute Nazi-looted art and compensate Holocaust
victims after the war, 196 the Austrian government enacted legislation
in 1995, giving the Austrian Jewish community ownership of
"heirless" art looted by Nazis, which had been simply sitting in
storage since the war. 197 The art was auctioned to benefit Holocaust
survivors and their heirs. 198 Then, "[i]n January and February 1998,
a series of articles by Hubertus Czernin appeared in the Viennese
newspaper, Der Standard, reviewing the methods by which Austrian
National Museum personnel virtually extorted art from Jews who,
having survived, chose to leave Austria after the war." 199 On
December 4, 1998, in response to continued exposure of Austria's
post-war exploitation of gifts from survivors in exchange for export
permits, the Austrian Parliament enacted legislation to provide for
"restitution notwithstanding such legal obstacles as the statute of
200
limitations."

195.
Id.
196.
See generally Eric Rosand, Confronting the Nazi Past at End of Twentieth
Century: The Austrian Model, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 202 (2002) (discussing the
resolution of issues which arose during negotiations between the U.S. government and
Austria to establish humanitarian foundations that would make payments to certain of
those who suffered under the Nazi regime).
197.
Kelly Ann Falconer, Note, When Honor Will Not Suffice: The Need for a
Legally Binding InternationalAgreement Regarding Ownership of Nazi-Looted Art, 21
U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 383, 416 (2000) (citing CNN Newsroom: A Sale of Art
Confiscated from Jews During World War 11 Closes a Chapter in the History of the
Holocaust (CNN television broadcast Nov. 26, 1996) (transcript available in CNN file of
LEXIS News Library) ("[T]he Austrian people in general, either forgot about them or
didn't know what to do with them. They're basically heirless pieces of art.")).
198.
Id. This auction is referred to as the Mauerbach auction.
199.
Lowenthal, supra note 24, at 135.
200.
Normal Palmer, Federal State Act on the Return of Cultural Objects, in
MUSEUMS AND THE HOLOCAUST 178-79 (2000), available at http://www.lootedart.com/
InformationByCountry/AustriaLaws/20policies%/20and%/20guidelineslaws.asp
(follow "Federal State Act on the Return of Cultural Objects, 4 December 1998"). See
also
http://www.lootedart.comInformationByCountry/AustriaLaws, 2Opolicies 20
and%20guidelines/laws.asp (follow "Styrian Provincial Law of 14 March 2000");
http://www.lootedart.comlInformationby country/Austria/Laws, Styrian Provincial Law
of 14 March 2000 on the Return or Taking to Account of Works of Art or Cultural
Assets Confiscated from Their Owners During the Nazi Regime; Resolution of the
Vienna
City
Council
of
29
April
1999,
available
at
www.lootedart.com/InformationByCountry/AustriaLaws,/20policies /20and /20guidel
ines/laws.asp (follow "Resolution of the Vienna City Council of 29 April 1999").
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museum panel to identify works that [should] be returned. '20 1 One
consequence was that the Rothschild family retrieved 200 pieces of
art that were auctioned at Christie's for $90 million. 20 2 Many,
however, did not believe Austria went far enough in its recent
attempts to rectify its Nazi past. In fact, the 2000 U.S. Presidential
Commission on Holocaust Looted Art and Assets reported that
Austria's "restrictive restitution process [immediately after the war]
impeded the return of assets to victims. 20 3
These shortcomings in Austria's post-war practices were
highlighted again after litigation was filed concerning Schiele's
Portraitof Wally. During or before 1938, Portraitof Wally came to be
housed in the apartment of a Viennese gallery owner, Lea Bondi
Jaray, an Austrian Jew. 20 4 After Germany annexed Austria in the
Anschluss, 20 5 Friedrich Welz aryanized 2° 6 Bondi's gallery and coerced
Bondi to give him Portrait of Wally, as well.2 0 7 Bondi gave up the
painting and fled to London with her husband. 20 8 After World War II,
when Welz was interned on suspicion of war crimes, the U.S. military
seized his possessions. 20 9 In accordance with post-war military
decrees and policies, the United States returned the property to the
government of the country from which it was taken, Austria, not the
individual from when it was taken. 2 10 Thus, Portraitof Wally was
returned to the post-war Austrian governmental body authorized to
2 11
take custody of such property, the BDA.
After the war, Portraitof Wally was erroneously believed to have
belonged to the estate of Dr. Heinrich Rieger, who, along with his

201.
Lowenthal, supra note 24, at 135.
202.
Hugh Eakin, Unfinished Business, ARTNEWS, Sept. 1, 1999, available at
1999 WL 9955745.
203.
U.S. PRESIDENTIL ADvISORY COMMISSION ON HoLocAusr AsIsm IN THE UNITED
STATES, PLUNDER AND REIIr/rON: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDTAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HOLOCAUST Assms IN THE UNrTED STATES AND STAFF REPORT (2000),

aailableat httpi/govinfo.libary.untedu/ph

underRestitutiorhtml/html/Home-contents.html Oast

accessed Oct. 27, 2005).

204.
Portraitof Wally, 2002 WL 553532, at *1. All facts are taken as stated in
the Third Amended Complaint, No. 99-9940, 2002 WL 553532 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002).
205.
"Anschluss" can be defined generally as "the historical euphemism
describing Nazi Germany's bloodless annexation of the Post-World War I Austrian
Republic." Brian F. Havel, In Search of a Theory of Public Memory: The States, The
Individual, and Marcel Proust,80 IND. L. J. 605, 621 n.28 (2005).
206.
"Aryanization" can be defined generally as the process "whereby Jews were
forced to sell their property to 'Aryans' at artificially low prices." Portraitof Wally, 2002
WL 553532, at *1.
207.
Id.
208.
Id.
209.
Id. at *2.
210.
Id.
211.
Id.
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wife, perished in the Holocaust. 2 12 The Rieger heirs were able to
recover much of the art stolen from their parents, which they then
2 13
sold to the Osterreichische Galerie Belvedere (the Belvedere).
Although the Rieger heirs did not claim ownership of Portrait of
Wally, when the art they sold was shipped from its storage place to
the Belvedere, Portrait of Wally was mistakenly included in the
214
shipment.
Bondi subsequently learned of the circumstances when she
returned to Austria immediately after the war and confronted Welz
about her property. 215 She returned to London after this meeting
unconcerned about the painting "because she believed [it] was safe at
the Belvedere Gallery." 216 She recovered her art gallery (and,
arguably, title to Portrait of Wally) in 1949 and, in a restitution
action against Welz in 1953 she allegedly enlisted the aid of Dr.
217
Rudolph Leopold to recover Portraitof Wally from the Belvedere.
In 1954, unbeknownst to Bondi, Leopold acquired the painting from
the Belvedere for himself. 218 Bondi discovered Leopold's betrayal
when she saw him listed as the owner of Portrait of Wally in an
exhibition catalogue in 1957.219
to
Bondi then engaged an Austrian lawyer and another colleague 220
avail.
no
to
but
Wally,
of
Portrait
of
possession
regain
her
help
Bondi passed away in 1969, and the efforts to recover Portrait of
Wally seem to have remained dormant until her heirs had an
opportunity to act in late 1997.221 She had never filed any formal
proceeding to attempt to recover Portraitof Wally. After her death, an
unsigned handwritten note was found in her London apartment,
which stated:
I myself prevent a court case with the Belvedere (Museum for Modern
Art in Vienna) as I was reinstated as the proprietor of the Gallery
Wiurthle, Gallery exclusive for Modern Art, and as this it was not
possible for me to quarrel with the Museum of Modern Art and tried to
222
get my picture back by peaceful means.

In 1997, the Leopold Museum-Privatstiftung (the Leopold) lent
Portraitof Wally to the New York Museum of Modern Art (MOMA)

212.
213.
Gallery.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at *2.
Id. The Belvedere also is commonly referred to as the Austrian National
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Third Amended Compl.

gg, Portraitof Wally, 2001 WL 34727703.
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for exhibition. 223 By this time, the painting was valued at over $2
million. 224 Three days after the exhibition ended, the Manhattan
District Attorney's Office issued a subpoena for the painting, but the
subpoena was quashed because a New York anti-seizure statute
prohibited its seizure at the state level. 225 Nonetheless, an U.S.
magistrate judge issued a warrant to seize the painting a few hours
later, and the federal government thus began a civil forfeiture
proceeding. 226 The magistrate issued the warrant after finding
probable cause that the Leopold had violated the NSPA by
transporting the painting in foreign commerce while knowing that it
227
was stolen property.
Glenn Lowry, the director of the MOMA, testified before the
House Committee on Banking and Financial Services on February 10,
2000, after pre-trial discovery in Wally had been underway for some
time. Lowry described how MOMA has dedicated significant
resources to provenance research of all of its holdings and stated
unequivocally: "The Museum of Modern Art does not, and will not,
knowingly exhibit stolen works of art.'' 228 Likewise, other museums
have dedicated significant resources, including full time staff, to

223.
Dr. Leopold is "a Director and the Museological Director for life" of the
Leopold. Portraitof Wally, 2002 WL 553532, at *1, *4.
224.
Id. at *4.
225.
Id. (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Museum of
Modern Art, 93 N.Y.2d 729 (App. Div. 1999)). The New York Arts and Cultural Affairs
Law prohibited any seizure of any work of fine art on loan to any museum or other nonprofit exhibitor of art in the state of New York. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.03
(McKinney 1984 & Supp. 2000). At the time, the law provided in full:
No process of attachment, execution, sequestration, replevin, distress or any
kind of seizure shall be served or levied upon any work of fine art while the
same is enroute to or from, or while on exhibition or deposited by a nonresident
exhibitor at any exhibition held under the auspices or supervision of any
museum, college, university or other nonprofit art gallery, institution or
organization within any city or county of this state for any cultural,
educational, charitable or other purpose not conducted for profit to the
exhibitor, nor shall such work of fine art be subject to attachment, seizure, levy
or sale, for any cause whatever in the hands of the authorities of such
exhibition or otherwise.
Id. After Portrait of Wally was decided, the New York legislature eliminated the
protection against seizure in criminal forfeiture proceedings, at least temporarily. See
Collins, supra note 154, at Cl. The amendment eliminating the protection against
criminal forfeiture proceedings as written was "deemed repealed on June 1, 2002." N.Y.
ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 12.03, Historical and Statutory Note L.2000, c. 39. § 2.
Research indicates that the amendment expired quietly on that date.
226.
Portraitof Wally, 2002 WL 553532, at *4.
227.
Id.
228.
Holocaust Assets Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Financial
Services, 106th Cong. 95 (2000) (statement of Glenn D. Lowry, Director of Museum of
Modern Art, New York).
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provenance research. 22 9 Lowry further stated: "It is gratifying and
encouraging to be able to report to you that despite the enormous
devotion of resources to this issue, American museums have, to date,
23 0
discovered very few problems with their collections.
Lowry also spoke specifically about Wally. 23 l Lowry described
the issues in Wally as "knotted in difficult questions of inheritance
and post-War restitution. ' 232 Lowry noted that Wally "had been
exhibited around the world for decades and... had been reproduced
frequently in books. '23 3 In regard to one of the claimants and
purported heirs, Lowry stated:
The man who asserted his family's rights in the painting wrote to us
about his vivid recollections about seeing the picture in his aunt's house
in Vienna before the War. But, according to the pre-War owner's
grandson, the claimant never saw the painting, never set foot in the
house in Vienna, and is not, as a matter of fact, an heir, a fact the
claimant has recently conceded in a British newspaper interview.
Despite all this, the U.S. Justice Department has commenced a
forfeiture proceeding to reclaim this alleged heir's painting, politicizing
our courts and making it almost impossible to engage in the kind of
meticulous and dispassionate research required to ascertain the exact
history of this painting immediately before and after the Second World
War, and who, today, is its rightful owner.
I mention this example not to discuss the merits of the claim or to delve
into the extremely sensitive moral and legal questions of who may
rightly assert claims and when they should do so, but to demonstrate
that the process of determining what, if any, art in American museums
was looted by the Nazis and never returned to the proper owner, and
then trying to determine who the proper owner might be, is an
extremely complex undertaking, and is made even more so when the
works in question are loans to, rather than objects owned by, the
relevant institution.
Just as we have learned that American and European museums,
working with the AAMD guidelines, 2 3 4 can play a vital role in
reuniting looted art with its rightful owners, we have also learned most

229.
See, e.g., id. (statement of Earl A. Powell III, Director of the National
Gallery of Art).
230.
Id. (statement of Glenn D. Lowry, Director of Museum of Modern Art, New
York).
231.
Id. at 95-97.
232.
Id. at 96.
233.
Id. Lowry also discussed a claim made as to Dead City III, also by Egon
Schiele, which was on display along with Portraitof Wally. A warrant did not issue for
that painting, which has since been returned to Austria. It seems that the claimants
had no colorable claim to the painting. Id.; Bruce Balestier, Return of PaintingBlocked
by U.S. Attorney, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1999, at 1. See also Judith H. Dobrzynski, German
Court Revokes Ruling on Ownership of a Schiele Painting,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1998, at
E6 ("German court revokes 1963 declaration of heirship that is basis of Rita Reifs and
Kathleen E. Reifs claim to Egon Schiele's Dead City; painting was confiscated by Nazis
from Fritz Grunbaum, who died in Dachau in 1941... ").
234.
See generally Daniel Range, Deaccessioningand Its Costs in the Holocaust
Art Context: The United States and GreatBritain,39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 655 (2004).
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emphatically that use of criminal process is not an appropriate way to
address this issue. With the immensely valuable participation of groups
like the Commission for Art Recovery of the World Jewish Congress, we
have seen that the most effective means to resolve problems involving
the return of Nazi looted art requires good faith, discretion, and
cooperation between museums and claimants, not the blunt
instruments of subpoena power and forfeiture proceedings.
For museums and for the public, involvement of criminal process is
235
counterproductive.

Nonetheless, others have different views. For example, Larry
Kaye, a well-known Manhattan plaintiffs attorney in the art field
whose firm represents the Bondi family in Wally-not the claimants
who were being discussed by Lowry-wrote in regards to Wally:
To say the subpoena created an uproar is to put it mildly. Museums
claimed to be "shocked," expressing concern that such action would slow
or stem the international flow of artwork into New York. The Austrian
government also expressed outrage. Various organizations made
statements supporting one side or the other, and the media weighed in
on both sides. But, to the victims of the Holocaust, the subpoena
symbolized a willingness to provide a much-needed forum to redress
past wrongs. In my view, the District Attorney's actions were a proper
2 36
and welcome exercise of his powers.

Although it would be impossible to ever remedy the Nazi
atrocities of the Holocaust, Austria has made an effort to come to
terms with its Nazi past. Besides passing the above legislation and
holding the Mauerbach auction, in 2000 the Austrians effectively

235.
See Rebecca Keim, Filling the Gap Between Morality and Jurisprudence:
The Use of Binding Arbitration to Resolve Claims of Restitution Regarding Nazi-Stolen
Art, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 295 (2003) (discussing how the judicial system is illequipped to handle Nazi-looted art claims and advocating for resolution via

arbitration); Alan G. Artner, Ethics and Art Museums Struggle For Correct Response to
Stolen Art Claims, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 16, 1998, at 6 (quoting Constance Lowenthal, then
director of the World Jewish Congress in New York as stating that "[arbitration] is
certainly a possibility, because these cases-which keep arriving with alarming
regularity-and the laws that have been made with them, particularly those involving
World War II, are not well-known to most judges."). Interestingly, a German court
ordered the seizure of Bauhaus Staircase-a 1932 painting by Oskar Schlemmer,
considered an "icon" of MOMA's collection, which was on loan to an international
exhibition-"for investigation of its provenance based on a claim to ownership by
Schlemmer family members." Patricia Youngblood Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict

of Laws in Litigation Between Original Owners and Good Faith Purchasersof Stolen
Art, 50 Duke L.J. 955, 1034 (citing Judith H. Dobrzynski, Modern is Focus of a New
Dispute Over a Painting,N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 2000, at E3). The painting was shipped
back to MOMA before the seizure warrant was served. Id. The German proceeding has
been described as the "mirror image" of Wally. Id.
236.
Lawrence M. Kaye, A Quick Glance at the Schiele Paintings, 10 DEPAULLCA J. ART OF ENT. L & POL'Y 11, 13 (1999). The Author would like to note that
although she criticizes Portraitof Wally, she admires the excellent advocacy skills of
Howard Spiegler and Lawrence Kaye of the Herrick Feinstein firm, and she is thankful
for their willingness to share information about the case.
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settled the slave-labor class actions by creating the Austrian Fund for
Reconciliation, Peace and Cooperation and endowing it with six
billion Austrian shillings, or approximately $500 million. 237 Perhaps
most importantly, Austria issued a formal apology for its role in
World War II, a dramatic step away from the widely-held Austrian
view that, as the first country overtaken by Hitler, it was a victim
rather than a voluntary ally of Nazi Germany. 238 In light of Austria's
efforts to atone for its Nazi past, some have described the seizure of
Portrait of Wally as "particularly insulting. '239 But many do not
believe Austria has gone far enough in its recent attempts to rectify
its Nazi past. 240 It also must not be forgotten that as recently as 2000,
Freedom Party was a part of the governing
Jorg Haider's so-called
24 1
coalition in Austria.
B. CAFRA-Increasing Due Process Safeguards
Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress has tightened up the rules
governing civil forfeiture actions by passing CAFRA: 242 "CAFRA
revises almost all aspects of federal administrative and civil judicial
forfeitures." 24 3 Two sections of CAFRA potentially apply to stolen art

237.
Eric Rosand, Confronting the Nazi Past at End of Twentieth Century: The
Austrian Model, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 202 (2002) (providing the view of a
representative of the State Department involved in the treaty negotiations).
Id.
238.
239.
Kelly Ann Falconer, Note, When Honor Will Not Suffice: The Need for a
Legally Binding InternationalAgreement Regarding Ownership of Nazi-Looted Art, 21
U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 383, 417 (2000).
Given Austria's then model behavior, the decision of the New York district
attorney to seize the two allegedly looted works seemed "particularly insulting."
When the district attorney seized the two paintings, Austria was attempting to
come to terms with its past and to offer a fair resolution to the problem of Nazilooted art. Unilateral action such as that of the New York District Attorney,
thus not only shakes the trust underlying the international art trade, but also
calls into question a nation's integrity. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
E.g., id. at 210 ("The difference of views concerning the adequacy of
240.
Austria's post-war efforts, however, was never, and probably never will be, finally
resolved, given the historical and legal complexities involved.").
E.g., Kate Connolly, Remember Jorg Haider?, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 29,
241.
2001, available at www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4126258-103478,00.html; Kurt
Richard Luther, The Self-Destruction of a Right-Wing Populist Party? The Austrian
PaliamentaryElection of 2002, W. EUR. POL., Apr. 1, 2003 at 13B, available at 2003
WL 20032788; see also The Associated Press, Pope Visits a Synagogue in Germany,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2005 (reporting Pope's statements about rising anti-Semitism in
Europe).
242.
18 U.S.C. § 983 (2000) [hereinafter CAFRA].
243.
Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), 195 A.L.R. FED. 349
(2004); see generally Stefan D. Cassella, The Uniform Innocent Owner Defense to Civil
Asset Forfeiture: The Civil Asset Forfeiture Act of 2000 Creates a Uniform Innocent
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litigation. Section 983(c)(1) alters the burden of proof in civil
forfeiture actions and provides that "[i]n a suit or action brought
under any civil forfeiture statute for the civil forfeiture of any
property... the burden of proof is on the Government to establish, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to
forfeiture." Previously, even as recently as 1999 when Portrait of
Wally was seized, the government needed only to prove "probable
2 44
cause" that the property at issue was subject to forfeiture.
Section 983(d)(1)(A)(i) establishes a new innocent-owner defense,
which places on a claimant the burden to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the claimant dispossessed of property "did not know
of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture. 2 45 Because "CAFRA
declares that an innocent owner's interest in property shall not be
forfeited under any civil forfeiture statute," 246 "almost all federal civil
'24 7
forfeiture statutes are now subject to the innocent owner defense.
Importantly, § 983(d)(3) defines an "innocent owner" who obtains an
interest in property after the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture has
occurred as a person who, at the time of acquiring the interest in the
property "(i) was a bona fide purchaser or seller for value; and (ii) did
not know and was reasonably without cause to believe that the
'248
property was subject to forfeiture.
There is an important inconsistency in the cases thus far decided
under CAFRA in terms of what a claimant must show to establish the
innocent owner defense. Some cases hold that the claimant must
show only that he, she, or it had "dominion and control over" the
property at issue, whereas other cases hold that ownership must be
established by "state law,"249 presumably after applying the state's
choice-of-law principles. Especially where there are two parties

Owner Defense to Most Civil Forfeiture Cases Filed by the Federal Government, 89 KY.
L. J. 653 (2001).
244.
Van Arsdale, supra note 243, at 349.
245.
CAFRA, supra note 242, § 983(d)(2)(A)(i).
246.
Van Arsdale, supra note 243, at 365.
247.
Id. But see U.S. v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar Material, 252 F. Supp.
2d 1367, 1377 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (holding that CAFRA does not apply to forfeitures
pursuant to customs laws, which the Lucite Ball court found do not constitute "civil
forfeiture statutes" under CAFRA). See generally U.S. v. An Antique Platter of Gold,
Known as a Gold Phiale Mesomphalos, C.400 B.C., 991 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(civil forfeiture where falsification of customs forms established that the platter was
"stolen" within the meaning of the NSPA).
248.
See CAFRA, supra note 242, § 983(d)(3)(A)(i)-(ii).
249.
Id. Compare U.S. v. One Lincoln Navigator 1998, 328 F.3d 1011 (8th Cir.
2003) (holding that to qualify as an innocent owner under CAFRA for purposes of a
challenge in federal forfeiture action, a claimant must establish the exercise of
dominion or control over the property) with U.S. v. 2001 Honda Accord EX, 245 F.
Supp. 2d 602 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (holding that for purposes of establishing the innocent
owner defense to a civil forfeiture action under CAFRA, the claimant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence a legal interest in the property in accordance with state
law).
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claiming the same property, it seems that the state's choice-of-law
principles would need to be applied to determine the relevant
substantive law and decide fairly between the two claimants.
Otherwise it is too difficult to see how competing claims can be
resolved. Thus, the same law that would apply to a traditional civil
dispute should control which of the two claimants is to be favored in a
civil forfeiture proceeding.
Despite the dramatic changes brought about by CAFRA, the two
art cases (loosely defined) to date that involve the application of
CAFRA to specific facts have decided the question in the negative.
Wally held that CAFRA did not apply because the government filed
its forfeiture proceeding before CAFRA's effective date. 250 One Lucite
Ball Containing Lunar Material also held that CAFRA was
inapplicable because the forfeiture was an administrative forfeiture
under a customs provision, not a civil forfeiture to which CAFRA
25 1
would apply.
The process whereby the government initiates a civil forfeiture
action, which then forces the holder of the property to prove rightful
252
ownership, has been criticized by many as unfair on many grounds.
This Article focuses on unfair aspects of civil forfeiture specifically
related to stolen art. The government dramatically increases the
leverage of claimants over current possessors in stolen art litigation
in three primary ways.
First, the statute of limitations issues in traditional litigation
often favors a defendant when the defendant has possessed art for a
long time, particularly when the art was purchased in a civil law
country with laws greatly favoring bona fide purchasers. 253 In
contrast, in civil forfeiture proceedings-at least those premised on
an alleged violation of the NSPA-the triggering event is the modern-

250.
Portraitof Wally, 2002 WL 553532, at *13-*14 (holding that government's
filing of an amended complaint was irrelevant under the "relation back" doctrine and
that CAFRA does not apply retroactively to pending forfeiture proceedings filed before
its effective date). But see U.S. v. $99,990 in U.S. Currency, 69 F. App'x 757 (6th Cir.
2003) (holding that CAFRA applies to judicial forfeiture proceedings pending on appeal
on CAFRA's effective date); see also U.S. v. 5 S. 351 Tuthill Road, 233 F.3d 1017 (7th
Cir. 2000) (leaving to the district court's discretion whether to apply CAFRA new
burden of proof on remand and holding that retroactive application is particularly
appropriate where a procedural rule is changed after a suit arises because rules of
procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct).
251.
One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar Material, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1377 n.4,
1378.
252.
See, e.g., H.R. 1658, supra note 185.
253.
See Patty Gerstenblith, Cultural Property and World War II: Some
Implications for American Museums a Legal Background 40 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 17, 19-20
(1998) (explaining that in civil law countries a bona fide purchaser may acquire good
title from a thief after the statute of limitations on the claim has passed).
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day transport of the object across a border. 254 Thus, a defendant's
statute of limitations or laches defense, 255 which would be available
in traditional civil litigation, seems to be preempted when the
government, instead of a civil plaintiff, initiates the suit. No case to
date has explored how the running of the applicable civil statute of
limitations impacts the categorization of the property as "stolen"
under the NSPA or the application of the CAFRA "innocent owner"
defense.
Second, it is widely accepted in Nazi-looted art cases that a
plaintiff should not file suit if the art in questions is not worth at
least $3 million. 25 6 This guideline, however, does not deter the
government: the government, unlike private non-corporate plaintiffs,
has great resources at its disposal to pursue litigation, including the
ability to file parallel criminal charges, an idea that did not escape
25 7
the American Association of Museums when Wally was filed.
Additionally, in situations where more than one party claims
entitlement to the object, both claimants would attempt to show the
right to possess the object by the same burden of proof. But, as a
practical matter, the government essentially would assist the
claimant on whose behalf it initiated the forfeiture proceeding.
Third, a civil plaintiff would have to prove under the temporary
restraining order (TRO) or injunction standards that the art should
be seized before the end of trial. In contrast, even under the more
restrictive standards of CAFRA, the government, in initially seizing
the property, must show only probable cause to believe that the
258
restrained assets are subject to forfeiture.
In contrast to the other dramatic features of civil forfeiturewhich seem to help only the would-be plaintiff in traditional civil
litigation-attorney's fees and interest 2 59 are available to any
successful claimant under CAFRA. Thus, if a would-be defendant in
traditional litigation can defeat the government's attempts to force a

254.
CAFRA provides that "[n]o action pursuant to this section to forfeit
property not traceable directly to the offense may be commenced more than 1 year from
the date of the offense." CAFRA, supra note 242, § 984(c).
255.
See, e.g., Steven A. Bibas, Note, The Case Against Statutes of Limitations
for Foreign Art, 103 YALE L. J. 2437, 2438 n.7, 2446-48 (1994) (discussing use of the
laches rule by courts to curtail protection for buyers of stolen art).
256.
Barbara J. Tyler, The Stolen Museum: Have United States Art Museums
Become Inadvertent Fences for Stolen Art Works Looted by the Nazis in World War II?,
30 RUTGERS-CAM L. J. 441, 445 n.17 (1999) (internal citation omitted). See also
HOWARD J. TRIENENS, LANDSCAPE WITH SMOKESTACKS: THE CASE OF THE ALLEGEDLY

PLUNDERED DEGAS (2000) (discussion by the defense attorney who first coined the "rule
of thumb").
257.
See Am. Ass'n of Museums Br., supranote 38, at 28 and accompanying text.
258.
U.S. v. Melrose E. Subdivision, 357 F.3d 493, 504-05 (5th Cir. 2004); Van
Arsdale, supra note 243, at 349.
259.
"[P]ost-judgment interest as set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 1961]" 28 U.S.C.
§ 2465(b)(1)(B).
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forfeiture of artwork, reimbursement is possible. 260 Attorney's fees
and interest, of course, are not available in most traditional civil
disputes. 26 1 Although a judge would have discretion to reduce the
amount of fees awarded, the fees are not capped.26 2 Additionally, at
least one court has held that the attorney's fees provision applies
retroactively even when the government filed the suit after CAFRA's
effective date.2 6 3 Thus, the Leopold may be able to recoup much of its
fees if it is ultimately successful in defeating the government's
attempt to force forfeiture of Portraitof Wally.
264
C. Femme En Blanc

The U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles instituted another civil
forfeiture proceeding to assist the heir of a Holocaust survivor
pursuing a stolen art claim in Femme en Blanc.26 5 In 1933, fearing
the Nazis' takeover of Berlin, Carlota Landsberg, a Jewish woman
living in Berlin, sent Femme en Blanc to a reputable dealer in Paris,
Justin Thannhauser. 266 After Kristallnacht, November 9-10, 1938,
Landsberg and her daughter fled Europe, eventually settling in New
York in 1940 or 1941.267 The Nazis stole the painting in Paris in
1940, and as they usually did when looting art, they kept precise
records of the painting and its last possessor. 268 After the war,
Landsberg, in accordance with the restitution mechanisms in place
after the war, filed a claim for the painting with the

260.
Van Arsdale, supra note 243, at 401.
261.
See generally CAFRA, supra note 242; see also Ekanem v. Health and
Hospital Corp. of Marion County, 778 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1885) (holding that plaintiffs
were not prevailing parties and thus not entitled to attorney's fees); Mercantile Nat'l
Bank v. Bradford Trust Co., 850 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that recovery of
attorney's fees is confined to two situations: (i) where under the restrictive American
rule, attorney's fees are allowed and (ii) where controlling substantive law permits
recovery).
262.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d). See Hastert v. Ill. State Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 28
F.3d 1430 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d)
creates a presumption that prevailing party will be awarded costs, decision to award
costs is within the discretion of the district court).
263.
5 S. 351 Ththill Road, 233 F.3d at 1017 (holding that retroactive
application is particularly appropriate where a procedural rule is changed after a suit
arises because rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct).
264.
Femme en blanc was painted in 1922 and dates from Picasso's "classic
period"-the years immediately following World War I. Glen Chapman, Fight for
Picasso Piece Could Move to Chicago, MUSEUM SECURITY MAILING LIST REPORTS, Jan.
11, 2003, www.museum-security.org/03/004.html.
265.
Civil Forfeiture Compl., U.S. v. One Oil Painting Entitled "Femme en
blanc" by Pablo Picasso, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2005) [hereinafter Compl.
Femme Forf.]
266.
Compl., Bennigson, 2004 WL 803616.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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269
Wiedergutmachungsamt von Berlin (Berlin Restitution Office).
Thannhauser sent her a letter in 1958 before his death, detailing his
knowledge of the looting and his persistent efforts to locate the
painting since the war. 270 It should also be noted that, as stated in
Thannhauser's letter dated 1958, the painting was illustrated in a
well-known book about Picasso's work, as well as in the Repertoire
des Biens Spolies en France Durant la Guerre 1939-1945 (List of
Property Removed from France during the War 1939-1945), recorded
under Thannhauser's name.2 7 1 This book, published in 1947, is very
2 72
The
well-known and is referred to in art circles as the "Repertoire."
evidence was overwhelming: the case was one of clear-cut looting, and
in 1969 the Berlin Restitution Office paid Landsberg DM100,000,
approximately $27,300, without prejudice to her right to recover the
painting if it ever was located (presumably with the understanding
that she would have to return the money if she successfully recovered
the painting).27 3 "Despite decades-long correspondence with the postwar governments of France and Germany and with a variety of
European art dealers, Landsberg was unable to locate the Picasso"

before she died in 1994.274

Meanwhile, in 1975, exactly thirty years after the end of all
World War II hostilities, New York art dealer Stephen Hahn
purchased the painting from Maurice Covo, owner and manager of
the Renou & Poyet art gallery in Paris, France for 630,000 French
francs. 2 75 The French statute of repose is thirty years. 276 A few
months later, Hahn sold the painting to Marilynn and James
Alsdorff, Chicago art connoisseurs who have often acted
philanthropically by donating paintings to museums.2 77 In regard to

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

274.

Id.

Id.
275.
276.
Id.; C. Civ. art. 2262 (Fr.) (2004), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
htmllcodestraduits/codeciviltextA.htm (last updated February 21, 2004); see Greek
Orthodox Partriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie's, Inc., No. 98, 1999 WL 673347, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1999) (noting that the French Civil Code bars actions for real and
personal property after thirty years of prescriptive possession). But see Warin v.
Wildenstein & Co., 746 N.Y.S. 2d 282 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2002) (declining to "take
judicial notice of the subject French ordinances for lack of information sufficient to
enable [the court] to determine their scope and effect").
277.
Compl. Bennigson, 2004 WL 803616. It also should be noted that James
Alsdorf, now deceased, "was a board member of the International Foundation for Art
Research, which was created in 1969 to educate the public about problems and issues
in the art world," and [IFAR] helped expand the Art Loss Register's data base of lost
artworks." Howard Reich, Whose Picasso is It?, Museum Security Mailing List Reports,
Jan. 21, 2003, www.museum-security.org/03/007.html. Additionally, Marilynn Alsdorf
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the provenance of the painting, the receipt states only "Private
'278
Collection, Paris.
This information must be viewed in light of the fact that during
the war, the Renou & Poyet gallery "was known as Renou & Colle,
and a report from the United States' Office of Strategic Services on
that Paris gallery called it a 'firm of art dealers who handled looted
art, notably from the Paul Rosenberg Collection.' 279 Hahn, who was
recently interviewed about the painting and the lawsuit, stated:
"When I saw that picture almost 30 years ago, nobody asked anything
about those things. Mrs. Alsdorf called me [recently], and I gave her
'280
all the information I had and where I bought it. That's all I know.
Since its purchase, "the painting remained in Mrs. Alsdorfs
possession continuously and was not publicly displayed, although
several museum officials apparently saw the painting in Mrs.
' '28
Alsdorfs home over the years.
All of that changed in 2001 when Alsdorf sent the painting to be
displayed in a small, public exhibition between September 20 and
October 28, 2001 at the David Tunkl Fine Art gallery in Los Angeles,
California. 28 2 After the exhibition, Tunkl returned the painting, but
suggested to Alsdorf about January 2002 that he could sell the
painting for her. 283 On or about January 29, 2002, the painting was
shipped from Chicago to Geneva, Switzerland. 28 4 "In Geneva, the
painting was viewed by Paris art dealer Didier Imbert, who was
acting as an advisor to an unidentified European collector. '28 5 Tunkl

presently is head of the Art Institute of Chicago's committee on European painting and
the "Alsdorff Foundation is currently a financial supporter of IFAR." Id.
278.
Compl. Femme Forf., supra note 265.
279.
Id.
280.
Id. The government's complaint in the forfeiture proceeding states that in
an August 9, 2002 meeting between an Art Loss Register representative and Covo,
Covo stated "that he had received the painting from a collector who had obtained it
from a dealer who was investigated by a postwar tribunal on charges of benefiting from
sales to the Nazis," although Covo also reportedly stated "that he believed the dealer to
be honorable." Id. T 39. It is unclear from the Complaint whether Covo indicated he
knew of this history of the painting when he bought it. Covo stopped meeting with Art
Loss Register representatives around September 12, 2002, when he wrote a letter to
the Art Loss Register stating that he had "nothing to say unless the 'current holders of
the painting as well as its claimants provided their written assurances that neither he,
his gallery, nor anyone else would suffer any 'hardship or prejudice' as a result" of his
disclosures. Id.
41. At this time, the Art Loss Register was representing Silva Case
Foundation, see below, and seemed willing to issue such a letter to obtain the pre-1975
provenance of the work, but Alsdorfs representatives seem to have been unwilling as
no "hold harmless letter was apparently provided to Covo by anyone." Id. Hahn has
since signed an affidavit in Alsdorfs declaratory judgment action, see below, stating
that he had no knowledge of the painting's Nazi taint when he purchased it.
281.
Id.
19.
282.
Id.
283.
Id.
284.
Id.
285.
Id.
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seemingly arranged the meeting through a New York dealer, who was
Imbert's contact for the viewing. 28 6 "As part of his due diligence,
Imbert contacted the Art Loss Register in London, England. 28 7
"The Art Loss Register serves as a clearinghouse of historical
information concerning Nazi looted paintings and at times assists in
negotiating the resolution of disputes concerning the ownership of
such paintings."2 8 8 Because the painting was listed in the Repertoire,
a red flag went up. 28 9 The court documents filed to date make no
explanation why the meeting was scheduled in Geneva, when Imbert
is based in Paris. Imbert is a well-known, reputable figure in the art
world who likely travels frequently to Geneva, so it is possible that
convenience was the only reason Geneva was chosen. 290 On the other
hand, perhaps Tunkl suggested they meet in Switzerland, which is
well-known for its liberal statutes of limitation favoring purchasers
who negotiate and conclude their purchases in Switzerland. 291 The
government's complaint alleges that after an Art Loss Register
representative first met with Imbert, the Art Loss Register
representative wrote in his notes: "He [Imbert] definitely thinks that
the picture is problematic and he has a feeling that the current owner
does too because he said that the owner had not given permission for
the picture to be taken to France (where pictures can be easily seized)
but only to Switzerland (Freeport). ''292 Sometime during Spring or
Summer 2002, Tunkl told Alsdorf that he had another potential
purchaser, and again arranged for the painting to be shipped to
Switzerland (presumably it was returned to the United States prior
293
to this second shipment to Switzerland).
•During this time, the Art Loss Register continued to investigate
and initially thought that the sole heir to the painting was the Silva
Casa Foundation, a Swiss foundation related to the Thannhauser
family. 294 The Art Loss Register began negotiating on the
foundation's behalf-first with Tunkl and then with his Los Angeles

286.
Id.
Id.
22. This also indicates that at least for present-day purchases of high287.
quality art created before World War II, seeking out information about a painting's
provenance during and after World War II is expected of one afforded bona fide
purchaser status.
23.
288.
Id.
Id.
289.
290.
See, e.g., Dider Imbert Fine Art, Complimentary Listings, INTERNET ART
RESOURCES, http://www.artresources.com/guide/comp.ihtml?a=1437 (last visited Sept.
6, 2005) (listing the address of Dider Imbert Fine Art in Paris, France).
See Gaia Regazzoni, The Beginning of the End?, THE ART NEWSPAPER,
291.
www.theartnewspaper.com/news/article.asp?idart=9752 (noting that Swiss statute of
limitations is about to be extended from five years to thirty years).
292.
Compl. Femme Forf., supranote 265, at 26.
Id.
293.
294.
Id.

20051

CHOICEBETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL REMEDIES

1239

attorney, whom Alsdorf retained. 29 5 Around May 2002, the Art Loss
Register discovered that Thannhauser had been holding the painting
on behalf of Landsberg, which documents in German archives in
Berlin and Koblenz confirmed. 29 6 The Art Loss Register later
discovered that Landsberg had passed away in 1994, but in June
2002 the Art Loss Register located her sole heir, Thomas C.
at7 the University of California at
Bennigson, then a law student 29
Berkeley Law School (Boalt Hall).
Bennigson reportedly "did not know the painting existed, or that
it had belonged to his grandmother, until the summer of 2002" when
the ALR contacted him. 298 The ALR "allegedly told Tunkl around the
same time [June 2002] that Bennigson was the rightful owner. 29 9
The Femme en Blanc litigation started as civil litigation in a state
court action filed in California by Bennigson. On December 10, 2002,
Bennigson's newly-retained Los Angeles attorney, E. Randol
Schoenberg, contacted Alsdorfs attorney, Bernard, about the dispute,
and they agreed to meet the week of December 18, 2002 upon
300
Bernard's return to Los Angeles from New York.
Meanwhile, Alsdorf met with Tunkl in Chicago on December 13,
2002. According to court documents, "[diuring that meeting, Alsdorf
learned for the first time that the ALR had changed its position
regarding the history of the painting, and that someone other than
the Silva Casa Foundation was now asserting an ownership claim to
the painting," and "[a]t that time knew nothing about the identity of
the new claimant."' 30 1 The court also found:
Alsdorf, uncomfortable with the conflicting positions the ALR had
taken regarding the painting's history, and believing no sale was
imminent, instructed Tunkl to return the painting to her in
Chicago ... When she instructed Tunkl... to return the painting,
Alsdorf did not know it was a California resident who had asserted a
claim of ownership to the painting, nor did she know a lawsuit was
about to be filed in connection with that claim. The painting was picked
up from Tunkl's gallery by a shipper on December 18, 2002. On
December 20, at 6:36 a.m., the painting left Los Angeles on a cargo
plane bound for Chicago. Later that morning the court issued the TRO
302
ordering that the painting remain in Los Angeles.

Meanwhile, according to court documents, Schoenberg sent an
email to Alsdorf's attorney, Bernard, on December 16, 2002, asking to

Id.
295.
296.
Id.
297.
Id.
Kenneth Ofgang, Chicago Philanthropist Sues Law Student to Secure Title
298.
to Picasso Allegedly Stolen by Nazis, METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE, Sept. 14,
2004, www.metnews.com/articles/2004/benn091404.htm.
299.
Id.
300.
Schoenberg Decl. 3, Bennigson, 2004 WL 803616.
301.
Bennigson, 2004 WL 803616, at *2.
302.
Id.
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30 3
set up a meeting and view the painting, but received no response.
On December 18, 2002, Schoenberg called Bernard, who allegedly
stated that the painting was "on its way back to Chicago" and "that
he believed that Illinois law would be better than California law for
his clients [Alsdorf and Tunkl]. '' 304 Bernard also allegedly stated,
which seems to correspond to other reports about the case, that "his
clients believed that Mrs. Landsberg had owned the painting and that
it had been stolen by the Nazis from Thannhauser, but that they were
not certain whether Mrs. Landsberg had merely entrusted the
painting to Thannhauser or sold it to him. ' 30 5 That same day, Tunkl's
assistant contacted a Los Angeles shipper, Gallery Services, to have
the company pick up the painting that day. Tunkl's assistant also
contacted the New York dealer who was the intermediary in the
30 6
Imbert viewing to oversee the shipment.
On December 19, Bennigson's attorney rushed to the Los Angeles
courthouse to file an action for replevin and injunctive relief
prohibiting the transport of the painting. 30 7 He also filed a motion for
30 8
a temporary restraining order to prevent shipment of the painting.
Judge Person refused to rule on the motion ex parte, but agreed to
hear the motion the next day after Alsdorf had notice of it. 30 9 At the
hearing, the judge granted the TRO, but then Bernard informed the
judge that the painting had been shipped a few hours earlier. 310 The
311
judge modified the TRO to allow the painting to be held in Chicago.
A hearing to determine whether the TRO should be converted into a
preliminary injunction was scheduled for a later date because Alsdorf
3 12
was vacationing.
Subsequently, Alsdorf acknowledged receipt of service of process
but moved to quash it. 313 She alleged that the court lacked
jurisdiction over her, arguing that the painting was no longer in
California and that she did not have the requisite minimum contacts
with California for its courts to exercise jurisdiction over the
dispute. 314 One of the key issues was the determination of the effect
of the shipment of the painting out of California on the very day the
complaint was filed. 3 15 Beningson argued that Alsdorf had attempted

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

E.g., Compl. Femme Forf., supranote 265,
Id.
46.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

311.

Id.

312.
313.
314.

Id.
Id.
Id.

315.

Id.

45.
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to evade jurisdiction in California by having the painting sent back to
3 16
Chicago.
The judge postponed the preliminary injunction hearing to rule
on the motion to quash. 317 He ruled in favor of Alsdorf. 318 Bennigson
appealed, but was denied relief by the California Court of Appeal on
April 15, 2004. 319 Bennigson filed a petition for rehearing, which was
denied on May 11, 2004.320 Bennigson petitioned the California
Supreme Court to review the case. 32 1 On July 28, 2004, the justices
on that court unanimously agreed to hear the case. 322 Bennigson and
Alsdorf submitted opening briefs. 323 The court scheduled oral
arguments, but in light of subsequent events, there will be no need
324
for the court to rule.
Approximately two weeks after the California Supreme Court
agreed to review the case, Alsdorf filed a declaratory judgment action
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
325
Illinois in Chicago to seek to quiet title in relation to the painting.
This case has since been dismissed, 326 particularly because the FBI
seized the painting in Chicago and because the United States
Attorney's Office in Los Angeles initiated civil forfeiture proceedings
against the painting in rein in October 2004.327 All litigation has
since been dismissed because Bennigson and Alsdorf settled all the
3 28
claims between them for $6.5 million.
D. Comparison of Portrait of Wally and Femme en Blanc
The risk of erroneously depriving an innocent purchaser of
previously displaced art "is particularly high in light of the complex
legal issues and historical data, covering decades or even centuries,
that frequently must be taken into account in determining ownership
of artwork. '32 9 In such cases, "there is a more than normally high risk

316.
Id.
317.
Bennigson, 2004 WL 2806301, at *3.
318.
Id.
319.
Id. at *4.
320.
Id.
321.
Id.
322.
Id.
323.
Id.
324.
See, e.g., Press Release, FBI, $10 Million Picasso Painting Stolen by Nazis
During World War II Seized by U.S. (Oct. 26, 2004) (on file with author); Compl.
Femme Forf., supra note 265.
325.
Alsdorf, 2004 WL 2806301, at *4.
326.
Id. at *11.
327.
Press Release, FBI, supra note 324; Compl. Femme Forf., supra note 265.
328.
Bob Egelko, $6.5 Million Settlement in Suit over Stolen Picasso Painting,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Aug. 9, 2005, at B1.

329.

Am. Ass'n of Museums Br., supra note 38, at 11.
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that accusations of possession of stolen artwork may be made on the
basis of incomplete information that may subsequently be proven
inaccurate. '330 In light of the high risk of false allegations that
previously displaced art retains its looted taint, the government
should take caution before initiating civil forfeiture proceedings.
There are significant differences between Portrait of Wally and
Femme en Blanc that dictate different conclusions as to the propriety
of using the civil forfeiture mechanism in each case.
The most obvious factor in evaluating the propriety of initiating
a civil forfeiture proceeding is the level of evidence indicating that the
art in question was looted and never restituted. With Femme en
Blanc, there was overwhelming evidence, consisting of many official
documents, that the art was looted-the German government
recognized the theft in a restitution proceeding immediately after the
war, and the art indisputably never was returned to the victim. In
fact, the Art Loss Register still reported the painting as looted when
Alsdorf attempted to sell it in 2002, as initially was reflected in the
Repertoire. In contrast, with Portraitof Wally, the only evidence in
the record that the painting was, in fact, aryanized by Welz and never
restituted, consists mainly of allegations about Bondi's statements
and her informal, undated, and unsigned note. But, of course, that
evidence cannot be tested today in a court of law because Bondi is
now deceased. Although in light of Welz's post-war conviction for
looting Jewish property, it seems likely that the property was looted,
unsupported hearsay about the looting that cannot today be
confirmed is much less persuasive evidence than the written
documentation typically kept by the Nazis when they aryanized
property.
There also remains some question as to what may have
happened with Portraitof Wally between the war and Bondi's death
in London. The undated note found in Bondi's London apartment
after her death indicates that the painting never was restituted.

Museums frequently encounter such situations. One highly publicized example
involved an allegation by Professor Sol Chaneles, former Chairman of the
Department of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University, that a Chardin
painting, Boy Blowing Bubbles, owned by the [Museum of Modern Art], had
been seized from a Jewish family by Nazi agents. Based on investigations that
he conducted, Chaneles alleged that, upon recovery of the Chardin, instead of
returning it to its owners, American soldiers had smuggled it into the United
States. Subsequently, [after just one day of researching its files, the Museum of
Modern Art] was able to provide evidence that in fact the painting had been
returned to its owners from whom the [Museum of Modern Art] had acquired
the painting.

Id. at 12 n.9; Douglas C. McGill, Met PaintingTraced to Nazis, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov.
24, 1987 at C19; Editor's Note, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 25, 1987, at A3.
330.

Am. Ass'n of Museums Br., supranote 38, at 12 n. 9.
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Because the note was undated and Bondi and all other relevant
witnesses are now deceased, however, one never can probe whether
any informal arrangement about the painting may have been made
between the date Bondi wrote the note and the date of her death. An
informal arrangement through which the Belvedere agreed to
purchase a significant amount of art through her gallery after the
war if Bondi would not pursue the painting, is one possibility that is
not precluded by the contents of the note.
Even if such an informal arrangement never was reached, key
differences exist regarding the application of such doctrines as laches,
waiver, abandonment, and estoppel to the ownership analysis. First,
with Portraitof Wally, Bondi's note demonstrates that she made a
conscious decision not to pursue the painting in any formal
proceeding. The note reflects that Bondi declined to formally pursue
the painting because it would have been awkward or difficult to do so
in light of the fact that she again took up her rightful position in the
art community, operating the leading modern art gallery in Vienna.
Bondi successfully navigated the Vienna courts to regain possession
of her other property aryanized during the war; this fact indicates
that systematic injustice after the war that may have infected the
efficacy of the Austrian restitution mechanism was not the root of her
decision not to pursue the painting. Accordingly, it seems problematic
to proceed against Austria today, especially in light of the fact that it
was known to Bondi that the painting was displayed prominently at
the Belvedere.
In contrast, with Femme en Blanc, Landsberg was diligent in
pursuing her art. She successfully pursued a restitution claim in
Germany after the war to be compensated for the looted artwork,
which was not located by authorities after the war. Nonetheless,
Landsberg (and Thannhauser) actively sought the painting and had it
listed in the Repertoire. It was not until Alsdorf offered the painting
for sale in 2002 in a private sale that Landsberg or her heir,
Bennigson, could have known of the painting's whereabouts. Until
1975, it .seems the painting was hidden in a gallery known to have
dealt in Nazi-looted art until it was purchased through a New York
dealer by Alsdorf, who kept the painting hanging on a wall in her
private residence. The painting was not publicized in brochures by
galleries or museums because it never was publicly displayed until it
was sent to the small Tunkl gallery in California in late 2001. A few
months later, a potential buyer had a search run by the Art Loss
Register, and Bennigson was located only a few short weeks
thereafter and promptly initiated suit.
A third key difference is the strength of the evidence as to
whether the current possessor should be considered a bona fide
purchaser. In both cases, the evidence on this point is a bit
problematic. Although no one in the art world seems to doubt
Alsdorf's integrity, especially in light of the fact that she and her
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husband (now deceased), were financial supporters of the
International Foundation for Art Recovery, it is possible that at least
the dealer from whom she bought the painting would not qualify as a
bona fide purchaser. If that art dealer could be deemed, as a matter of
law, to be Alsdorf's agent, then her status as a bona fide purchaser
33 1
would be brought into question.
Also troubling is the fact that Femme en Blanc was purchased
exactly thirty years after the war, exactly when the French statute of
limitations likely elapsed on Nazi-looted art. On the one hand, this
favors finding that a purchaser would have believed he or she was
gaining valid title, which would seem to render it more difficult for
the government in a civil forfeiture proceeding to establish scienter,
as required by the NSPA. On the other hand, some might view the
fact negatively, reasoning that the purchaser was unfairly trying to
buy stolen art, which was no less stolen because the applicable
statute of limitations had elapsed. Compounding suspicion, the
potential purchaser of Femme en Blanc reportedly stated to the
government that he felt the seller (Alsdorf) may have had knowledge
the painting was looted because she would only authorize the
painting to be viewed in Switzerland, not France where looted art is
more likely to be seized.
Finally, Alsdorf engaged in "jurisdictional hopscotch," moving
the painting from one location to another, seemingly to make it more
difficult for Bennigson to file a traditional civil suit against her. The
painting was moved from Los Angeles, California, to Chicago, Illinois,
after Bennigson's lawyer, who was located in Los Angeles, had
contacted Alsdorf's lawyer. Although not found by the California
court, Alsdorfs lawyer's statements about the decision to move the
painting could mean that the move was based, at least in part, on a
desire to avoid California's laws, which generally could be described
as favoring Holocaust survivors, and secure a more favorable forum
for the dispute in Chicago by initiating the declaratory judgment
action there. In contrast, although Portraitof Wally was slated to be
shipped from New York back to Austria because the Schiele
exhibition at the MOMA came to an end, Austria did not

331.
Further, although also quite possibly an innocent purchase and perhaps
inadmissible in the event that a trial ever would have occurred in the case, the Alsdorfs
had been connected once before with stolen antiquities. Charles F. Keyes, The Case of

the Purloined Lintel: The Politics of a Khmer Shrine as a Thai National Treasure, in
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ITS DEFENDERS: THAILAND 1939-1989 261, 270 (Craig J.

Reynolds ed., Silkworm Books 1993) (discussing a lintel that disappeared from Phanom
Rung):
[ult reappeared in 1967 when a Mr. James Alsdorf presented it as a loan to the
Art Institute of Chicago where it has remained ever since; in 1983 the Alsdorf
Foundation made the lintel a gift to the Institute. Alsdorf said he had
purchased the lintel in 1967 from an art dealer in New York.
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preemptively move the painting to avoid a lawsuit by the time the
civil forfeiture proceeding was filed.
These differences between the two cases indicate that the case of
Femme en Blanc is much stronger than the Portrait of Wally case.
Granted, there is a common issue as to the applicable statute of
limitations in both suits. Nonetheless, Femme en Blanc clearly was
looted, and absolutely no evidence would support application of the
doctrines of laches, waiver, estoppel, or abandonment had the
litigation proceeded as a traditional civil suit. To the contrary,
Landsberg diligently sought the painting, filed a formal restitution
claim in relation to the painting, had the painting included in the
Repertoire, and never had an opportunity to file traditional civil
litigation to recover the painting because it never was publicly
displayed until 2001. In contrast, although the evidence regarding
Portraitof Wally indicates that the painting was looted, the evidence
is hearsay that no longer can be substantiated because Bondi is
deceased. Further, the undated, unsigned note, while making one
sympathetic to Bondi's plight, constitutes evidence that would
support strongly application of the doctrines of laches, waiver,
estoppel, and abandonment had traditional civil litigation been filed,
especially because Portrait of Wally was known to hang in the
Belvedere since the 1950s.
As discussed in Section IV, these differences render Femme en
Blanc, but not Portrait of Wally, appropriate for a civil forfeiture
proceeding premised on a purported violation of the NSPA.

IV. CONCLUSION

One could argue that every tool in the arsenal should be used to
restore Nazi-looted art to survivors who owned it before the war and
their heirs. Certainly, many believe that morality firmly supports this
view.3 3 2 There are, however, some negative consequences of using
NSPA criminal prosecutions or civil forfeiture proceedings too
aggressively, and many of those consequences are not widely reported
in the press.333
For example, as stated by one scholar in regard to application of
the NSPA to foreign archaeological materials:

332.

See e.g., Hector Feliciano, Nazi Plunder: Seeking Moral Justice by the

Return of Looted Art, L.A. TIMES, Jan 11, 1998, at Ml ("Returning looted art is,
fundamentally, a matter of moral justice and memory. Our chance to do today that
which we will not be able to do even a few years from now-to gather all the pieces of
the puzzle.").
333.
Cf. Nowell, supra note 32, at 95-97.

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

1246

[VOL. 38.'1199

Broad application [of the NSPA] limits the negotiating position of the
State Department in establishing, by international agreement, the
details of protection of cultural materials...
The theft and removal of cultural materials from their country of origin
is an international problem. The NSPA, however, is a national statute,
with prosecution dependent upon Justice Department interpretation.
To the extent that NSPA prosecutions interfere with or retard efforts at
a more comprehensive solution to the entire movement of foreign origin
archaeological materials problem, prosecution should be reconsidered.
334

This scholar's warnings, written in 1978, remain sound and have
relevance to the current controversy concerning the use of the civil
forfeiture mechanism to seize Nazi-looted art.
The CAFRA innocent owner defense insulates a true bona fide
purchaser from civil forfeiture premised on a NSPA violation.
Although the NSPA likely would not apply to most purchasers of
Nazi-looted art, it could apply to current possessors of Nazi-looted art
who obtained the art during or even shortly after the war-when the
issue of Nazi looting was commonly known and European nations
passed laws vitiating racially-motivated sales during the war. 335 This
issue has never before been presented to a U.S. court, and it is
possible that a U.S. court would take such an approach, even if the
passage of time since World War II might have shielded a current
possessor from civil liability pursuant to later-enacted, valid statutes
of limitation or repose in European nations. 336 Although some such
possessors may assume that their purchases are now insulated, at
least in terms of civil liability, transporting Nazi-looted art into the
United States or across a state line would trigger the NSPA because
the triggering event is the transport of the art, not the initial
purchase.3 37 Regardless of the fact that a civil litigant's remedy may

334.
Id. at 95-96 (internal citations omitted).
335.
Although under the McClain doctrine, local law where an object was
acquired is deemed to control whether an object was "stolen" for purposes of the NSPA,
Germany and Austria declared after the war that all property transfers pursuant to
Nazi laws were void. Eric Rosand, Confronting the Nazi Past At End of the 20th
Century: The Austrian Model, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 202 (2002). Finding the names of
certain dealers known to have traded in artwork looted from Jews in the provenance of
a work is a sufficient red flag to potential purchasers that the work was looted. E.g.,
Kaye & Spiegler, supra note 1, at S3 ("In recent years lists of dealers who collaberated
closely with officials of the German government and Nazi Party members have
generally been circulated."). Whether a purchaser should qualify as a bona fide
purchaser of an artwork with such a provenance could turn on whether the artwork
was purchased by the time it was widely known that the dealer at issue was a Nazicollaberator. Id.

336.

But see Steven A. Bibas, The Case Against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen

Art, 103 YALE L.J. 2437, 2438 n.7, 2446-48 (1994).
337.
Cf. Portrait of Wally, 2002 WL 553532 (holding that the NSPA may be
triggered in civil forfeiture cases, contrary to the doctrines which normally apply in
civil forfeiture cases). See also cf. Upton, supra note 60, at 571 ("the McClain
convictions set a precedent which would expose museum trustees to the risk of federal
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be barred by the statute of limitations, valid legal-as opposed to
marketable-title 338 would not be deemed to have passed under the
law of any state in the United States. It is presently unclear whether
subsequent vesting of title under a foreign statute might, for purposes
of the NSPA, be deemed to have vitiated the relevance of the initial
theft.

33 9

Additionally, the term "stolen" in the NSPA was interpreted in
McClain to mean "acquired or possessed, as a result of some wrongful
or dishonest act of taking, whereby a person willfully obtains or
retains possession of property which belongs to another, without or
beyond any permission given, and with the intent to deprive the
owner of the benefits of ownership."3 40 As McClain established, courts
should apply the U.S. definition of theft to cases where the object in
question was taken abroad; 341 this definition could be deemed to
apply to Nazi-looted art, regardless of whether foreign civil statutes of
limitation or repose might shield the current possessor from civil
liability.
This issue was not presented in the archaeological cases,
Hollinshead, McClain, or Schultz, because the laws in Guatemala,
Mexico, and Egypt clearly vested ownership in the state, thereby
rendering the objects "stolen" under the NSPA standard and
satisfying the scienter requirement.3 42 A case-by-case analysis of the
national laws applicable to individual works of art, as well as their
individual factual histories and the current possessor's knowledge of
the relevant law and factual history, would be necessary to predict
whether transporting specific pieces of art that were looted sixty

criminal prosecution if the museum arranges an interstate loan of pre-Columbian
objects.").
338.
E.g., Kaye & Spiegler, supra note 1, at S2 ("A basic tenet of U.S. law that
distinguishes it from that of most civil law countries is that no one, not even a good
faith purchaser, can obtain good title to stolen property.").
339.
The McClain doctrine provides that "courts should apply the broad
American definition of theft and use foreign local ownership laws to determine whether
foreign origin archaeological materials have been 'stolen."'. Nowell, supranote 32, at 92
(citing McClain I, 545 F.2d 988 at 1001-02). For examples of application of the broad
definition, see U.S. v. Turley, 532 U.S. 407, 417; U.S. v. Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1227
(9th Cir. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.S. 839 (1976) ("stolen' means acquired or possessed,
as a result of some wrongful or dishonest act or taking whereby a person willfully
obtains or retains possession of property which belongs to another, without or beyond
any permission given, and with the intent to deprive the owner of the benefit of
ownership"); Lyda v.U.S., 279 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1960) (holding that § 2314 reaches all
ways by which owners are wrongfully deprived of the use or benefit of their property).
340.
McClain I, 545 F.2d 988, 993-84 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., U.S. v.
Anderson, 532 F.2d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.S. 839 (1976).
See, e.g., Nowell, supra note 32, at 95 ("The McClain court's decision to
341.
apply the American definition of theft to cases of foreign situs removal of archaeological
materials supports the intent of the NSPA to protect owners of property.").
342.
See supra Section I.
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years ago by the Nazis could potentially subject someone to criminal

liability under the NSPA.
Although prosecuting a criminal claim now for what was an act
of theft sixty years ago may seem like an unlikely exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, 343 since the mid-1990s, numerous U.S.
governmental entities have demonstrated a strong commitment to
remedying the vestiges of legal injustices of the Holocaust that to this
day still remain. 344 Further, the executive branch under President
Clinton dedicated significant resources to successfully negotiate the
creation of European funds known as "foundations," to compensate
Holocaust survivors in exchange for "legal peace" for German and
Austrian government and industry in the United States. 345 The
executive branch is bound to enter "Statements of Interest" under the
executive agreements entered in conjunction with the creation of the
foundations, which encourages U.S. courts to dismiss cases that could
be resolved through the foundations rather than U.S. courts. None of
the executive agreements, however, specifically applies to artwork

"It is within the power accorded to the executive branch to say when the
343.
policy embodied in the criminal statute should prevail and prosecution be instituted."
McClain 1, 545 F.2d at 1002 n.30 citing U.S. v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (en banc) cert. denied
381 U.S. 935 (5th Cir. 1965). Of course, "due process is offended when a prosecution is
arbitrary or instituted without fair notice that the challenged activity is in violation of
the law." Upton, supra note 60, at 609 (criticizing McClain 1).
344.
E.g., Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, § 1564, 112 Stat.
15 (1998).
345.
See generally STUART EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS,
SLAVE LABOR, AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR 11 (2004); MICHAEL J.
BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA'S COURTS

(2003); Garrett Perdue, The Victim's Fortune: The Struggle for Restitution for
Holocaust Victims, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 423 (2003). But see William Glaberson,
Holocaust Survivors in U.S. Say Settlement Slights Them, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2003,
at B4, 2003 WLNR 5645268.
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the
(although the Austrian agreement mentions chattels). 346 Indeed,
34 7
agreements expressly carve out art litigation from their scope.
The State Department has not filed a Statement of Interest in
any of the Nazi-looted art cases. This is true despite the fact that
survivors, their purported heirs, or both have filed suit in the United
States against current possessors of Nazi-looted art. This has
occurred in the wake of Wally, which was filed before the agreements
were reached, no doubt increasing the pressure on Austria to enter an
agreement. 348 The closest the State Department came to expressing
its views in an art case was when it filed an amicus brief in Altmann
after the Supreme Court granted certiorari on a narrow jurisdictional
issue unrelated to the merits of the case. 349 The brief supported the
Austrian National Gallery and argued for dismissal of the plaintiffs
case.3 50 Nonetheless, U.S. courts have not dismissed Nazi-looted art
cases summarily-even as late as sixty years after the war-on
statute of limitations grounds. 351 Finally, as discussed in Part III, two
U.S. Attorney's Offices have filed civil forfeiture suits over Nazilooted art-one in 1998 and another in 2004.352 Thus, the policy of
the United States seems to be that the doors to the courts are open to
353
survivors seeking justice.

346.
On July 17, 2000, non-governmental organizations, plaintiffs' attorneys, the
United States, Germany, Israel, and a number of other countries signed an agreement
to resolve almost all pending claims of Holocaust survivors and heirs against German
companies. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Foundation
"Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future," July 17, 2000, available at
http://www.usembassy.de/germany/img/assets/8497/agreement.pdf (last visited Oct. 27,
2005). Annex A to the Agreement, however, does "not preclude an applicant from
bringing an action against a specific German entity (i.e., government agency or
company) for the return of a specifically identified piece of art if the action is filed in
the Federal Republic of Germany or in the country in which the art was taken,
provided that the applicant is precluded from seeking relief beyond or other than the
return of the specifically identified piece of art. Annex A, 14. See also Rosand, supra
note 335 (discussing similar Austrian Foundation). The Swiss banks entered a
settlement of class action litigation that resulted in a similar foundation, although it
was not created pursuant to international agreement.
See e.g., Annex A of the Agreement between the Government of the United
347.
States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning
the Foundation "Remembrance,Responsibility and the Future,"July 17, 2000, available
at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eurholocaust/000717 agreement-anex_a.html.
348.
Portraitof Wally, 105 F. Supp. 2d 288.
349.
540 U.S. 1101 (2004).
350.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (No. 03-13), availableat 2003 WL 22811828.
351.
See, e.g., DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1273 (2d Cir. 1994)
(discussing the difficulty of resolving the statute of limitations issue).
352.
See supra Section III.
353.
Additionally, both New York and California have exerted regulatory
pressure, passed laws encouraging settlement of claims that may not have been legally
viable at this late date. N.Y. TAX LAW § 13 (McKinney 1999) (providing tax exemptions
for targets or victims of Nazi persecution and "qualified settlement funds established

1250

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38.1199

Utilizing criminal prosecutions or civil forfeiture proceedings too
aggressively, however, could cause the art community to regress from
its movement toward open provenance research. In the past, at least
one scholar, in the context of discussing ways to cut back on the black
market in archeological materials, has advocated that civil remedies
to combat looting are preferable to criminal remedies. 354 Among other
reasons for advocating the use of civil remedies over criminal
remedies, that scholar maintained that the NSPA's "application is
limited to cases involving easily proved thefts. ''3 55 This scholar
concluded that "civil recovery is probably a more efficient general use
of United States Government resources than application of the
NSPA" and advocated for modification of traditional civil remedies in
the form of attorney fee and cost shifting statutes or even for the U.S.
government "to represent national or private owners of stolen
3 56
cultural property in civil actions for recovery."
This approach seems wise, in the limited context of archeological
materials which have strong indications of being recently stolen,
although the adoption of CAFRA makes civil forfeiture pursuant to
the NSPA fairer than it had been. Nonetheless, in the context of
claims that arose over sixty years ago, using the NSPA to stack the
litigation so strongly in favor of the claimant runs a high risk of
unfairly punishing bona fide purchasers who, for over sixty years, had
little indication that there was any problem with their title. The Nazilooted art problem is much like the black market antiquities market,
in that overly aggressive use of the NSPA runs the high risk of
"unnecessarily alienat[ing]" "dealers, scholars, and museum staff
members, upon whose expert knowledge, services, and cooperation
357
successful" return of stolen objects depends.
Although it may be true that the current possessors could in turn
sue the individuals or galleries who originally sold them the art, it is
highly unlikely that most current possessors would be made whole by
a lawsuit for two reasons. First, the original sellers may be deceased
or defunct. Second, legal fees would cut into the profits. The legal fee
issue is the same for survivors and their heirs suing as plaintiffs
unless they are represented pro bono. In fact, most scholars and
practitioners in the art law field regard litigation as a poor means to

for the benefit of victims or targets of Nazi persecution by or in the Swiss
Confederation"); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3 (West 2004) (providing that any action
against a "museum or gallery that displays, exhibits, or sells any article of historical,
interpretive, scientific, or artistic significance" for return of "Holocaust-era artwork"
"shall not be dismissed for failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations,
if the action is commenced on or before December 31, 2010."). Further, every state has
a statute prohibiting the receipt of stolen property.
354.
See Nowell, supra note 33, at 102-07.
355.
Id. at 86-87.
356.
Id. at 104-05.
357.
Id. at 97.
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resolve these disputes. Nonetheless, it would be naive to believe that
survivors or their heirs would have met with as much success as they
have if no successful law suits had been filed to date.
Another potential negative consequence if forfeiture is too widely
used (and if statutes of limitation are too liberally construed in U.S.
courts) is a reduction in the amount of art sent to the United States
for display. The art community is in widespread agreement that the
international exchange of art generally is beneficial to mankind for
intellectual, cultural, and political reasons. 358 On the other hand,
most in the art community are of the opinion that "stolen art . . .
should not travel freely. '' 359 Nonetheless, many in the art community
caution that pursuing stolen art too aggressively drives it
underground to the point that the chances of recovery become close to
nonexistent; they further contend that aggressive pursuit cuts down
on the amount of art-even without provenance problems-that
360
lenders are willing to ship to the United States.
In the end, each case brought in pursuit of Nazi-looted art is
unique and should be treated as such. Thus, the pursuit of civil
forfeiture should not be a knee-jerk reaction automatically regarded
as wise when purported heirs of survivors seek return of art looted at
one time by the Nazis. The potential negative consequences are real
and should be considered seriously before a U.S. Attorney's Office
decides to seek civil forfeiture of stolen art or criminal prosecution of
those currently possessing the art, sixty years after the war. Given
the passage of time, it is likely that few current possessors of Nazilooted art, in contrast with those who bought and sold European art
sixty years ago, acted with scienter in acquiring or retaining the art.
A moderate approach to civil forfeiture is best to balance the
interests of present-day possessors with the interests of present-day
possessors of the art. Otherwise, in cases where the present-day
possessor is foreign, the actions of an individual U.S. Attorney's
Office may interfere with the ability of the State Department to
resolve remaining legal issues pertaining to the Holocaust at a
diplomatic level. 361 Regardless of whether the present-day possessor

358.
Ely Maurer, The Role of the State Department Regarding National and
Private Claims for the Restitution of Stolen Cultural Property, in THE SPOILS OF WAR
142 (Elizabeth Simpson ed., 1997).
359.

PAUL M. BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 33 (1981) (speaking in

the context of cultural antiquities and archeological treasures).
See Am. Ass'n of Museums Br., supra note 38, at 26-27 (describing
360.
instances where foreign lenders have withdrawn offers to lend art to U.S. museums
because of Portrait of Wally). See also id. at 29 n.27 (discussing inadequacy of
Immunity from Seizure Act to provide a full remedy to the problem).
Cf. Judith H. Dobrzynski, Strategy in Schiele Art Case Questioned, N.Y.
361.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1999, at E3 available at 1999 WLNR 3092467 ('The State Department,
wary of an international contretemps, was reluctant to intervene" in the Portraitof
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is foreign or domestic, wisely choosing which cases warrant use of the
civil forfeiture mechanism will prevent alienating the art community,
whose cooperation (in regard to access to information and funding) is
essential to learning more about the provenance of art looted during
World War II. The Department of Justice should exercise control over
individual U.S. Attorneys to insure that prosecutorial discretion is
exercised in favor of initiating a civil forfeiture proceeding only when
the balance of the factors below favors such action.
1. The evidence that the painting was looted and never
restituted is extremely strong and well-documented, particularly by
governmental records of the Nazi regime or post-war European
governments' restitution tribunals.
2. The claimant can demonstrate conclusively that he or she is
the Holocaust survivor from whom the art was looted or a valid heir.
The government generally should initiate a civil forfeiture proceeding
only if all heirs will file claims in the suit. Otherwise, the civil
forfeiture proceeding will not conclusively establish ownership of the
art.
3. Even if the statute of limitations would have run had the suit
been filed as traditional civil litigation today, the Holocaust survivor
or heir was not inactive in pursuing the artwork. This should hold
true when the whereabouts of the artwork could have been easily
known to the survivor (or his heirs) such that the doctrines of laches,
waiver, abandonment or estoppel very likely would have prevented
the claimant from winning traditional civil litigation.
4. Evidence that the current possessor did not purchase the
painting in good faith and likely would not successfully assert the
CAFRA innocent owner defense, such as where the present-day
possessor purchased the art from a reputable dealer between the
years 1980 and 1994.
5. The current possessor, instead of engaging in good-faith
settlement negotiations, is engaging in "jurisdictional hopscotch" such
that the Holocaust survivor or heir is having difficulty finding a
forum to hear a traditional civil suit.
In conclusion, following these guidelines would allow the
Department of Justice to evaluate when justice requires initiation of
a civil forfeiture proceeding or restraint.

Wally controversy when the claimants initially sought governmental help to effect
seizure.).

